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1.  Introduction 
Partisan theories follow  a rather simple logic. Voters have heterogeneous  preferences 
over outcomes, either because of differing economic interests or differing ideologies. For this 
reason, electorally motivated political parties are expected to adhere to divergent ideologies, to 
deliver  different  policy  programs,  and  to  serve  core  constituencies  which  are  differentially 
affected by macroeconomic outcomes. The partisan theories predict that leftwing governments 
will emphasize achieving low unemployment rates at the expense of higher inflation and suggest 
that rightwing governments will pursue low inflation rates at the expense of unemployment. 
Hence, the main character of partisan theory is often described as a “political macroeconomic 
outcomes theory of monetary policy” which works via a Phillips curve tradeoff (Havrilesky 1990, 
p. 50, and Way 2000).  
The old fashioned Philips curve models, however, imply that the inflation rate is almost 
exclusively  driven  by  monetary  policy,  notably  money  growth.  Several  studies  –  mainly 
originating from the late 1980s and the early 1990s – have investigated whether government 
ideology has had an influence on monetary policy and employed money growth as the dependent 
variable. The derivation of an ideologically driven money growth cycle, however, is not at all 
trivial  and  unambiguous  as  assumed  by  the  mainstream  partisan  theory  literature  (see,  for 
example, Belke 1996, pp. 98 104). Moreover, there is no consensus how parties affect monetary 
policy, but monetary surprises appear as an unconvincing driving force for traditional partisan 
political cycles (Drazen 2000). 
Scholars have recently investigated political and/or ideological impacts on unintermediate 
monetary policy instruments such as central bank interest rates instead of money growth, among 
them Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997), Boix (2000), Clark (2003) and Sakamoto (2008) for 
OECD countries. Politicians, however, do not directly have an influence on interest rates, but are 
obliged to institutional restrictions, most notably central bank independence. For this reason, 





Descriptive country Statistics: Central bank dependence 
Country  Mean  Std. Dev  # Obs 
Australia  0.41  0.03  104 
Cananda  0.34  0.03  84 
Germany  0.14  0.03  59 
Denmark  0.37  0.13  84 
Finland  0.56  0.33  104 
France  0.31  0.25  104 
Ireland  0.43  0.18  88 
Iceland  0.53  0.18  72 
Italy  0.54  0.23  104 
Japan  0.60  0.03  104 
Netherlands  0.29  0.12  104 
Norway  0.67  0.15  104 
New Zealand  0.65  0.12  104 
Sweden  0.50  0.28  96 
USA  0.25  0.00  84 
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Descriptive country statistics: short term nominal interest rate 
Country  Mean  Std. Dev  # Obs 
Australia  9.58  4.64  104 
Cananda  6.37  3.15  84 
Germany  4.43  2.29  59 
Denmark  6.50  3.30  84 
Finland  8.33  4.82  104 
France  7.44  3.99  104 
Ireland  7.38  4.22  88 
Iceland  11.31  7.64  72 
Italy  10.18  5.64  104 
Japan  3.59  3.24  104 
Netherlands  5.66  2.70  104 
Norway  9.09  4.18  104 
New Zealand  10.98  5.38  104 
Sweden  7.93  4.10  96 
USA  5.31  2.30  84 
Total  7.69  4.84  1399 
 
 
Descriptive country statistics: ideology (leftwing) 
Country  Mean  Std. Dev  # Obs 
Australia  2.97  1.05  104 
Cananda  2.98  1.26  84 
Germany  2.98  1.01  59 
Denmark  2.67  0.84  84 
Finland  2.85  0.36  104 
France  3.12  1.00  104 
Ireland  2.35  0.48  88 
Iceland  2.40  0.49  72 
Italy  2.98  0.64  104 
Japan  2.13  0.33  104 
Netherlands  2.83  0.86  104 
Norway  3.08  1.00  104 
New Zealand  2.82  1.16  104 
Sweden  3.69  0.73  96 
USA  2.76  0.98  84 










independent and subject to directives of the government. Interestingly, taking into account the 
interaction between central bank independence and government ideology, the existing studies 
suggest  that  leftist  governments  did  not  pursue  expansionary  monetary  policies  at  all.  The 
existing studies, however, do not only cover the time period till the beginning of this millennium, 
but also contain econometric shortcomings. 
In this paper, we therefore integrate government ideology, central bank (in)dependence 
and their interaction in monetary policy reaction functions (Taylor rule) in order to examine 
whether  leftist  governments  have  implemented  expansionary  monetary  policies  in  OECD 
countries from 1980.1 to 2005.4. We employ quarterly instead of annual data because central 
bank interest rates are volatile and can change remarkably per year. We use the updated indicator 
of government ideology by Potrafke (2009) that explicitly refers to the left right scale of the 
governing parties and the new time variant indicator on central bank (in)dependence by Klomp 
and De Haan (2008). The results suggest that leftist governments did not decrease short term 
nominal interest rates at all. In contrast, short term nominal interest rates were higher under 
leftist governments. A potential reason for this finding might be that leftist governments have 
sought to make a market oriented policy shift by delegating monetary policy to conservative 
central bankers. Overall, our results suggest doubt about the influence of government ideology 
on monetary policy. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the impact of 
government ideology on monetary policy and reviews the theoretical and empirical literature. 
Section 3 presents the data and specifies the empirical model. Section 4 reports the regression 










2.  Partisan monetary policy: theoretical background and empirical 
evidence 
 
Political business cycles and the partisan approach 
Various  economic  theories  explain  why  different  politicians  will  implement  different 
policies  –  Downs’  (1957)  fundamental  convergence  result  notwithstanding.  If  politicians  are 
assumed to be motivated not only by self interest but to also care about the political outcomes, 
probabilistic voting models exhibit equilibria in which leftwing and rightwing politicians offer 
different platforms.
3 The empirical political science literature provides interesting insights why we 
ought not to expect modern parties to be ideological in any pure sense of the word (e.g. Katz and 
Mair 1995, Blyth and Katz 2005). In spite of these developments, politicians’ behavior is however 
still expected to affect economic policy. The political business cycle approaches and the partisan 
theory  indicate  how  politicians  influence  macroeconomic  outcomes.  One  implication  of  the 
political business cycle theories (of Nordhaus 1975, and Rogoff and Sibert 1988, among others) is 
that all politicians will implement the same expansionary economic policy before elections. In 
other  words,  political  ideology  retires  to  the  background,  and  policies  converge.  In  these 
approaches,  informational  asymmetries  between  politicians  and  voters  take  centre  stage  in 
explaining  electoral  cycles.  The  incumbent  exploits  his  information  advantage  to  signal  his 
economic competence before elections.  
The partisan approach, on the other hand, focuses on the role of party ideology and 
shows  to what  extent  leftwing  and  rightwing  politicians will  provide  policies  that  reflect  the 
preferences of their partisans. The leftist party appeals more to the labor base and promotes 
expansionary  policies,  whereas  the  rightwing  party  appeals  more  to  capital  owners,  and  is 
therefore more concerned with reducing inflation. This holds for both branches of the partisan 
theory     the  classical approach  (Hibbs  1977)  and  the  rational  approach (Alesina  1987).
4  The 
traditional partisan theory (PT) is generally regarded as empirically valid if leftist governments 
                                                 
3
 See e.g. Mueller (2003): Chapters 11 13 and Persson and Tabellini (2000): Chapters 3 and 5 for a survey of the 
respective fundamental literature on party competition. 
4






Table 5. Regression results. Ideology and central bank dependence interacted (normalized) 
Dependent variable: short term nominal interest rate.  
Heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) Newey West type standard errors. 
  (1)  (2) 
  FGLS  FGLS 
Ideology  0.2324***  0.0233 
  [3.88]  [0.77] 
Central bank dependence  0.7259***  0.1784*** 
  [9.47]  [3.94] 
Ideology* Central bank dependence   0.0872   0.0509* 
  [1.41]  [1.68] 
Inflation  1.8657***  0.5611*** 
  [7.94]  [3.73] 
Output gap  0.0959***  0.0569*** 
  [3.60]  [3.56] 
Lagged dependent variable    0.8171*** 
    [16.59] 
Constant  9.0713***  0.7633 
  [8.65]  [1.52] 
Fixed Country Effects  No  No 
Fixed Period Effects  Yes  Yes 
Observations  1399  1396 
Number of N  15  15 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Table 6. Marginal Effects of government ideology (leftwing) at a minimum, average and 
maximum level of central bank dependence (normalized) 

























Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets (absolute values); * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***     











Table 3. Regression results. Basic Taylor Rule. 
Dependent Variable: Short term nominal interest rate.  
Heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) Newey West type standard errors. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  FGLS  FGLS  FGLS  FGLS 
Inflation  1.8275***  1.9707***  0.5535***  0.5841*** 
  [8.94]  [8.89]  [4.08]  [4.13] 
Output gap  0.0536**  0.0376  0.0618***  0.0447*** 
  [2.09]  [1.39]  [3.77]  [2.75] 
Lagged dependent variable      0.7604***  0.8231*** 
      [14.36]  [18.92] 
Constant  9.6155***  9.2393***  2.0834***  1.4797** 
  [11.08]  [10.80]  [3.28]  [2.16] 
Fixed Country Effects  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Fixed Period Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  1459  1459  1459  1459 
Number of N  15  15  15  15 
R Squared (overall)  0.81    0.94   






Table 4. Regression Results. Taylor Rule. Ideology included. 
Dependent variable: short term nominal interest rate.  
Heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) Newey West type standard errors. 
  (1)  (2) 
  FGLS  FGLS 
Ideology  0.3696***  0.0423 
  [5.86]  [1.29] 
Inflation  1.8721***  0.5786*** 
  [8.33]  [4.10] 
Output gap  0.0460*  0.0456*** 
  [1.70]  [2.79] 
Lagged dependent variable    0.8213*** 
    [18.68] 
Constant  9.9678***  1.3992** 
  [9.10]  [2.09] 
Fixed Country Effects  No  No 
Fixed Period Effects  Yes  Yes 
Observations  1459  1459 
Number of N  15  15 







cause a significantly higher (trend in) inflation and a significantly lower (trend in) unemployment 
(Berlemann and Markwardt 2007, Drazen 2000, Gaertner 1994). The rational partisan theory 
(RPT), however, claims upward (downward) post election blips in unemployment for rightwing 
(leftwing) regimes due to wage rigidities combined with electoral uncertainty. Following the more 
recent literature, we do not differentiate between PT and RPT any further. 
Empirical tests based on the old fashioned Philips curve partisan monetary policy models 
typically assume that the inflation rate is almost exclusively driven by monetary policy, notably 
money growth. These traditional tests, however, suffer from technical deficiencies in different 
regards.  First,  the  proponents  of  the  traditional  partisan  theory  such  as  Alesina  (1988)  and 
Havrilesky (1994), p. 117, for simplicity start from the assumption that the time pattern of the 
inflation rate and the money growth rate are identical at each point in time (Belke, 1996, p. 104). 
But  referring  to  the  well known  quantity  equation,  this  must  not  necessarily  be  the  case, 
especially if the growth rate of the income velocity of money is not equal to zero or if there is 
positive real growth. Second, the traditional studies focusing on money growth implicitly assume 
that money aggregates can be exactly steered by the monetary authority. Hence, as opposed to 
the view  taken in  the  mainstream  partisan  theory  literature,  the adequate specification  of  an 
ideologically driven money growth cycle is still open to debate (Belke 1996, pp. 98 104, and 
García de Paso 1996).  
Nevertheless, several studies   mainly originating from the late 1980s and the early 1990s   
test for ideological impacts on monetary policy and employ money growth as the dependent 
variable.
5 In these studies money growth is typically used as the dependent variable, while no 
importance is attached to the degree of central bank independence as a moderating variable. An 
encompassing  survey  of  the  empirical  results  for  the  partisan  theory  till  the  mid  1990s  is 
                                                 
5García de Paso (1996) shows in a game theoretic framework that one should expect higher average money growth 
rates under leftwing governments. However, a lot more studies examine the validity of the opportunistic Nordhaus 
type political business cycle theory instead of the partisan theory. As early examples, Meiselman (1986) and Grier 
(1989) find election cycle patterns in money growth data for the US. -8- 
 
provided, for example, by Belke (1996), p. 199, and pp. 214 216. These old fashioned studies on 
partisan monetary policy, however, need to be criticized in several ways.  
 
Central Bank Independence and channels of transmission 
Evaluating  whether  government  ideology  has  had  an  influence  on  monetary  policy 
requires a robust operationalization of central bank independence.
6 Most important, the greater a 
central bank’s ability to choose policy goals without government interference and the greater its 
control over policy instruments is, the more significant is its independence from politics. In other 
words, independent central banks control both the means and ends of monetary policy. Even the 
most autonomous central bank, however, does not make policy in a political vacuum (Hayo and 
Hefeker 2002, Lohmann 1998). To preserve their independent status and to fend off legislation 
aimed at changing bank organization, even the most autonomous banks, such as the former 
Bundesbank or the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank, had to accommodate political pressures in the 
past to some degree. For instance, public support for the central bank needs to be sufficiently 
strong to make the implementation of sometimes harsh monetary policy measures successful 
(Hayo  and  Hefeker  2002,  p.  670).  Hence,  although  some  central  banks  are  clearly  more 
independent than others, no bank is perfectly insulated from the demands of electoral or partisan 
politics. 
In  order  to  make  the  concept  of  ‘independence’  operational we  have  to  identify  the 
channels through which partisan influence from a specific administration and/or government 
may be transmitted to the central bank and affect monetary policy. Scholars have concentrated 
on three main transmission channels: 1) central bank appointments (Falaschetti 2002, pp. 492f., 
Galbraith,  Giovannoni  and  Russo  2007,  p.  18,  Gildea  1990,  Havrilesky  and  Gildea,  1992, 
Havrilesky and Schweitzer 1990, Lohmann 1998, Waller 1989, 1992, Chappell, Havrilesky and 
                                                 
6
 For an encompassing survey on the political economy of central bank independence see, for example, Eijffinger 
and De Haan (1996) and for recent contributions the survey by De Haan et al. (2008). 
-33- 
 
Other    
•  Efthyvoulou (2008) 
•  Growth rates of M1 
and M2, and two 
short term interest 
rates (retail bank 
marginal lending rate) 
and 3 month treasury 
bill rate) 
•  Cyprus/1978 
2006/quarterly 
•  Taylor rule specification 
•  Maximum Likelihood   ARCH 
(errors normally distributed) 
•  Test for significance of temporary 
and permanent partisan dummies 
•  Left wing governments follow 
more  expansionary  monetary 
policies  than  right  wing 
governments 
•  Monetary  growth  aggregates 
and, to a lesser extent nominal 
interest  rates,  are 




•  Serletis and Afxentiou 
(1998) 
•  Monetary base 
•  Canada/1926 
1994/annual 
•  Pre testing with integration and 
cointegration tests 
•  Examination of dynamic co 
movements of the cyclical 
components of key target and 
instrument variables 
•  Regressing the cyclical components 
of instrument variables against a list 
of partisan dummies 
•  Check of robustness to alternative 
stationarity inducing 
transformations of variables 
•  Party political dummies do 




•  Ferris (2008) 
•  Logarithm of the BoC 
bank rate/difference 
between the logarithm 
of the bank rate and 
the logarithm of the 
five year yield on 
government bonds 
•  Canada/ 1935–
2006/annual 
•  Error correction model  
•  Taylor reaction function with 
interest rate smoothing 
•  Set of political variables to test for 
the  partisan  distinctiveness  of 
electoral  outcomes,  PT  and  RPT 
dummies 
•  Election of a Liberal party 
government positively 
influences the expansiveness 
of Canadian monetary policy 
+ 
  
Note: Pluses (“+”) indicate that the cited studies found supporting evidence of ideological impacts on 






Table 2. Descriptive statistics and data sources 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev  Min  Max  Source 
Short term nominal interest 
rate  1399  7.69  4.84  0.03  37.67 
OECD Main Economic 
Indicatiors (2008) 
Ideology  1399  2.85  0.93  1  4  Potrafke (2009) 
Central bank dependence  1399  0.45  0.23  0.06  0.81  Klomp and de Haan (2008) 
Inflation (CPI growth)  1399  0.92  0.98  -1.93  8.54  OECD Main Economic 
Indicators (2008) 
Output gap 
1399  -0.65  2.61  -12.31  7.97 






•  OLS 
•  Robustness checks using M2, M3 
changes 
ideologically opposing 
Bundesbank council majority 
than a supportive one before 
elections. 
+ 
•  Berger and Woitek (2001) 
•  Short term (day to 




•  Test for PBC in Bundesbank 
monetary policy reaction function 
plus controls for the effects of fixed 
exchange rate regimes 
•  Indirect test: changes in money 
demand prior to elections occurred 
because, when political parties have 
different inflation preferences and 
election results are uncertain, 
rational investors avoid entering 
long term financial contracts before 
elections 
•  Vaubel’s (1997a) observation 
of central bank independence 
and political business cycles in 
German monetary aggregates 
•  But no sign of a systematic 
decline of short term interest 
rates before the election 
•  Cycles originated from 
partisan and electoral 
uncertainty induced shifts in 
money demand that were 
tolerated by the Bundesbank, 
because the bank followed an 
interest rate policy rule.14 
+ 
  
•  Berger and Woitek (2005) 
•  First part: change in 
the discount rate; 
second and third part: 
short term (day to day) 
interest rate 




meetings, second and 




•  OLS regressions of the percentages 
of “no votes” by Council members 
nominated by conservative, social 
democratic and neutral Laender and 
federal governments on discount 
rate changes in percentage points 
 
Second part 
•  Standard reaction function (TSLS 
estimation) for short term interest 
rates, including monetary targets 
and dummy variables to capture the 
effect of different council regimes 
or majorities. Among them: 
•  CONS = 1 whenever the number 
of conservative political votes in 
the Bundesbank Council exceeds 
50%. Otherwise CONS=0. 
•  Controls for periods of Bretton 
Woods and German unification. 
 
Third part 
•  Structural VAR in annualized 
differences: is monetary policy 
conducted under conservative and 
non conservative Bundesbank 
regimes different when interaction 
between interest rates and the 
determinants of monetary policy is 
taken into account? 
•  Compares the impulses based on 
just identifying restrictions and 
generalized impulse responses to 
sudden inflationary pressure. 
First part 
•  Social democratic appointees 
especially seem to be more 
likely to resist upward than 
downward changes of the 
discount rate. 
•  Conservatives in the Council 
cast their votes independently 
of the direction of the policy 
change.  
•  Neutral members lean in the 
direction of the social 





•  Only in the case of CPI 
inflation is the conservative 
long run coefficient 
significantly (at least at the 
10% level) larger than the 
long run coefficient under 




•  Conservatism mattered for the 
way the Bundesbank 
conducted monetary policy. 
•  More conservative Council 
majorities reacted more 
aggressively to inflationary 




                                                 
14
 Interest rate forecasts ranging far into post election periods imply a weighted average of the inflation rates over all 
possible election results. Hence, financial investors cope with this uncertainty by trading longer term assets for 
shorter term assets and, thus, enlarging monetary aggregate just before election dates which looks like a political 
business cycle à la Nordhaus (1975). 
-9- 
 
McGregor 1993); 2) direct signalling of desired monetary policies from the administration to the 
central bank
7 (Havrilesky 1988, 1991, Sieg, 1997), 3) bashing and coercion by the administration 
(García de Paso 2000, Lohmann 1998, Waller 1991).  
First, government ideology has an influence on (presidential) appointments to the board 
of the monetary authority. Though a central bank might be independent, political parties do have 
a certain influence on the bank, in that they nominate the members of the central bank council. A 
political party may tend exclusively to nominate individuals with political preferences similar to its 
own ones (Havrilesky and Gildea 1992; Havrilesky 1993, Vaubel 1993, 1997a and Berger and 
Woitek 1997).
8 These individuals, in turn, may feel loyal to the party which has appointed them 
(Goehlmann and Vaubel 2007). Thus, council members are associated with the views of one 
party, and they therefore may try to manipulate the economy to increase the election probability 
of  their  party  (Sieg  1997).  Empirical  analysis  of  Fed  board  members’  voting  patterns  leads 
Chappell, Havrilesky and McGegor (1993) to conclude that partisanship in the appointments 
process is the primary mechanism by which partisan differences in desired monetary policies arise.  
Second, signaling is an important channel. The government may send monetary policy 
signals to the central bank based on media appearances in which administration officials express a 
desire for easier or tighter monetary policy. This in turn might have a significant effect on the 
money supply. In reaction functions, the media coverage of the administration typically responds 
to variables which measure the state of the economy. Money growth, however, does not respond 
to the same state of the economy measures but does respond to signals from the administration 
                                                 
7
 This signaling is apparently opposed to the signals send from the central banks which are discussed extensively in 
the literature. For surveys of the literature on central bank communication and monetary policy see, for example, 
Blinder et al. (2008), De Haan (2008), De Haan et al. (2007). 
8
 Waller (1992) develops a bargaining model to analyze the appointment of central bankers in a two party political 
system. His model suggests that the party in power will appoint partisans early on but later appointments will be 
increasingly moderate in their views concerning monetary policy and that in equilibrium, nominations to the board 
are not rejected, thus confirmation hearings appear to be nothing more than a ‘rubber stamp’ process. The latter 
result implies that – at least theoretically   the out of power parties are not able to exert some influence through 
confirmation hearings. Mixon and Gibson (2002) deliver empirical evidence for the US which corroborates 
theoretical foundations of Waller's bargaining model. -10- 
 
(McGregor,  1996).  Following  the  appointment  process,  oversight  might  influence  monetary 
policy as well (Caporale and Grier 1998, p. 423, Falaschetti 2002, p. 492) 
Third, the transmission could be the result of direct political pressure on the members of 
the  monetary  policy  committee.  The  latter  might  undergo  bashing  and  coercion  by  the 
government. Moreover, political threats to the status, structure, or even existence of the central 
bank may force central bankers to comply with politically motivated demands on monetary policy 
(Lohmann 1998).  
Overall, to systematically influence the overall inflation rate, governments require control 
of monetary policy instruments. Since central banks are responsible for the conduct of monetary 
policy, it follows that differences in central bank organization imply variance in the ability of 
office holders to manipulate the inflation rate. As a result, the ability of governments to pursue 
distinctive partisan policies and to generate favorable outcomes of the inflation rate is contingent on 
the organization of central banking institutions, most notably central bank independence. Accordingly, 
the conventional logic and predictions of partisan theories of the macro economy should hold 
only in countries where the central bank is under political control, i.e. dependent.
9  
 
Recent empirical evidence 
Recent  empirical  studies  for  OECD  countries,  however,  do  not  suggest  that  leftist 
governments have pursued more expansionary monetary policies than rightwing governments. In 
contrast, interest rates were often found to be higher under leftwing than rightwing governments. 
Table 1 summarizes the results of the most recent studies on partisan monetary policy. During 
the last 13 years, only a few panel data studies were published. Among the single country studies, 
investigations for the U.S. and Germany dominate. 19 out of 24 studies reported in Table 1 
found supporting evidence of ideological impacts on monetary policy in one way or the other. 
                                                 
9 Other recent research has begun to rectify this oversight. Particularly notable are Alesina and Summers (1993), 
Clark and Reichert (1998) and Franzese (1999). 
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loyalties appear to play an 
important role in the 
Governors’ voting calculus 
+ 
•  Tempelman (2007) 
•  Actual changes in the 
fed funds rate along 






•  Narrative with permanent reference 
to Abrams and Iossifov (2006) 
•  Long sample period used by 
Abrams and Iossifov (2006) 
obscures changes in trends 
during the period stemming 
from advances in 
macroeconomic theory and  
the implementation of 
monetary policy.  
•  When one considers only the 
Volcker–Greenspan era 
(1979–2004), there is 
insufficient evidence to accept 
the notion of a political 




•  Berger and Woitek 
(1997a) 
•  M1 and the 
Bundesbank discount 
rate 
•  Germany/1950 
1989/monthly 
 
•  Multi equation VAR models with 
and without an additional trend 
component to cope with non 
stationarity 
•  Dummy for exogenous changes in 
government ideology 
•  Separate estimation for right wing 
and leftwing periods 
•  Almost  no  support  for  the 
predictions  of  the  partisan 
school,  neither  in  its  non 
rational  (Hibbs)  nor  rational 
expectations  versions 
(Alesina).  
•  It  appears  that  to  reproduce 
the  evidence  reported  by 
literature,  in  some  cases  the 
implications  of  non 




•  Vaubel (1997a, 1997b) 
•  At least partially 
seasonally adjusted 
monthly data for M1 
•  Germany/federal 
election dates 1949 
1994/monthly/season
ally unadjusted data 
•  Non parametric tests as a way out 
of the dilemma that using moving 
averages of monetary aggregate 
does not distinguish between 
successive central bank regimes in a 
clear cut way but the regime effects 
might have been swamped by 
control errors and noise in the data 
if month to month changes are 
used 
•  'Party preference hypothesis': 
Bundesbank tries to improve the 
electoral prospects of the 
government if the government 
commands a partisan majority in 
the central bank council, and it tries 
to prevent the government from 
being re elected if the opposition 
parties have a partisan majority in 
the central bank council. 
•  Monetary expansion (M1) 
accelerates when the 
government has a political 
majority in the central bank 
council at the beginning of the 
pre election period 
•  Monetary expansion 




•  Berger and Woitek (1997) 
•  Annualized M1 growth 
rate/ Bundesbank 
discount rate 
•  Germany/1950 
1989/monthly, 
seasonally adjusted 
•  Policy instrument regressed on its 
own lagged value and a dummy 
variable active in certain periods 
before federal elections multiplied 
by the partisan position of the 
majority of ‘political’ members of 
the Bundesbank council towards 
the government 
•  Time series analysis: results 
run counter to the Vaubel 
(2007) hypothesis.  
•  Central bank council minutes: 
results point in the same 
direction.  
•  Opportunistic government is 
better off facing an 
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and three month 
Treasury bill rate); 
movements in the term 
structure coincide 
exactly with 
movements in the 
discount rate 
•  U.S./1984 
2003/quarterly 
for heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation of unknown form. 
•  Examine whether the Federal 
Reserve’s monetary policy has 
exhibited a pattern of partisan bias 
in presidential election years 
•  Term structure is steeper and 
monetary policy more permissive in 
years when a Republican 
administration is seeking renewal 
than when it is not.  
•  Term structure will be flatter and 
monetary policy more restrictive 
in years when a Democratic 
administration is seeking renewal 
administration is in office, the 
term structure in the pre 
election year tends to be 
steeper, by values estimated at 
up to 150 basis points, and 
monetary policy is accordingly 
more permissive.  
•  When a Democratic 
administration is in office, the 
term structure tends to be 
flatter, by values also 
estimated at up to 150 basis 
points, and monetary policy is 
more restrictive. 
•  Federal Reserve systematically 
alters the term structure of 
interest rates, in advance of 
presidential elections, so as to 
assist Republicans and to 
harm Democrats, after 
controlling for the relevant 
economic variables. 
+ 
•  Gamber and Hakes 
(1997) 
•  Change in the Federal 
Funds rate 
•  U.S./1955.10 
1992.12/monthly 
 
•  Reaction function of Fed Funds 
rate  including aggregate supply and 
demand shocks 
•  Intercept and slope partisan 
dummies  
•  During Democratic 
presidential regimes  
The Fed responds to 
aggregate shocks more 
vigorously in pre election 
periods than in post election 
ones 
•  During Republican 
administrations monetary 
policy is more responsive to 
aggregate shocks in post 
election periods 
•  Monetary policy is more 
counter cyclically activist 
under a Democrat 
administration than under a 




•  McGregor (1996) 
•  Federal funds rate 
•  U.S./1960 1987/349 
regular meetings of the 
FOMC 
•  Interest rate reaction function 
•  Model  explains  the  votes  of  11 
members  and  the  interest  rate 
selected at each FOMC rneeting 
•  Structural parameters of the model 
are estimated by maximum 
likelihood 
•  Hypotheses tested using 
conventional statistics based on the 
likelihood function 
•  Impact of Democratic Governors 
voting under Democratic 
Presidents, Republican Governors 
voting under Republican 
Presidents, Democratic Governors 
voting under Republican Presidents 
and Republican Governors voting 
under Democratic Presidents 
•  Democratic Governors prefer 
lower interest rates than 
traditional Republican 
Governors and supply side 
(i.e., Reagan appointed) 
Governors prefer even lower 
interest rates than democratic 
Governors. 
•  Politically appointed 
Governors, taken as a group, 
prefer lower interest rates 
than the non politically 
appointed Reserve Bank 
presidents 
•  Controlling for the state of the 
economy and for the 
prevailing stance of monetary 
policy, both partisan 




The total number of 24 studies in the field implies that quantitative analyses of the effects of 
partisanship on monetary instruments have been relatively scarce (Boix 2000, p. 44). 
In the following, we briefly discuss the findings of three important studies on partisan 
monetary policy in OECD countries.  Clark (2003) examines the impact of left labor power on 
interest rates in a panel of (a maximum of) 14 OECD countries and finds that left labor power 
was associated with higher, not lower, interest rates. Boix (2000) evaluates the impact of socialist 
control of government and organizational power of labor on short term real interest rates in 
advanced nations in the period 1961 1994. The evidence he gains is mixed and depends on the 
sample and the specification chosen. Some of his results suggest that central banks under leftist 
governments increased short term real interest rates compared to rightwing governments. 
Sakamoto (2008) analyses panel data for 18 OECD countries in the period 1960 2001 and 
distinguishes  between  leftwing,  rightwing  and  center  governments  respectively  by  different 
variables.  His  basic  results  (p.  154)  suggest  that  leftist  governments  had  a  somewhat  looser 
monetary policy
10, whereas the coefficients of rightwing and center governments are statistically 
insignificant.  Interacting  the  leftwing  government  dummy  and  central  bank  independence, 
however,  suggests  that  leftist  governments  under  independent  central  banks  produced  the 
tightest monetary policy. “This suggests that central banks may have tightened monetary policy to 
offset  the  left’s  expansionary  policy  (remember  that  left  governments’  fiscal  policy  was 
expansionary when they faced independent central banks in the 1960s and 1970s)” (Sakamoto 
2008,  p.  228).  In  addition,  interacting  the  rightwing  government  dummy  and  central  bank 
independence,  suggests  that  rightwing  governments  under  independent  central  banks 
implemented a loose (expansionary) monetary policy (p. 240). 
These three studies, however, employ annual data. This is a serious shortcoming because 
central bank interest rates are volatile and can change remarkably per year. For this reason, more 
                                                 
10 His dependent monetary policy variable is calculated as “discount rates minus Taylor rule implied discount rates” 
See Sakamoto (2008), p. 90. 
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credible empirical set ups are required in order to examine whether leftist governments have 
implemented expansionary monetary policies in OECD countries. 
 
3.  Data and empirical strategy 
 
3.1 Data 
We use data provided by the OECD Economic Indicators (2008). The data set contains 
quarterly  data  for  short  term  nominal  interest  rates  of  potentially  23  OECD  countries.  The 
countries included are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece,  Iceland,  Ireland,  Italy,  Japan,  Luxembourg,  the  Netherlands,  New  Zealand,  Norway, 
Portugal,  Spain,  Sweden,  Switzerland,  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  USA.  The  potential 
observation period runs from 1970.1 to 2007.4. The time dimension of our panel, however, is 
strongly  diminished  due  to  missing  quarterly  data  on  the  output  gap  and  on  central  bank 
independence. Hence, we end up with a panel containing 15 OECD countries in the period 
1980.1 to 2005.4. The countries included in this sample are Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden 
and the USA. Figure 1 illustrates the short term nominal interest rates and Table 2 provides the 
descriptive statistics of the variables and the respective data sources.  
 
3.2 The empirical model and variables 
Empirical model  
We start from the usual baseline specification of the Taylor rule concept.
11 The variables 
included in this specification usually are the short term interest rate, the domestic inflation rate 
                                                 
11 Taylor (1993a,b) has shown that the actual monetary policy stance of the U.S. Federal Reserve, as measured by 
the level of the federal funds rate (the overnight inter bank lending rate), is well emulated by a simple rule, based on 
two macroeconomic variables: the deviations of the rate of inflation from its target (usually assumed to be 2 percent) 
and the output gap (the percentage deviation of real GDP from its potential value under the assumption of full 
employment). This is consistent with the Fed’s objectives “to promote effectively the goals of maximum 
employment, stable prices, and moderate long term interest rates” (BGFRS, 1994). Other things equal, a rise in the 
inflation rate calls for a tightening of the Fed’s policy stance (i.e., an increase in the Federal Funds Rate). A rise in the 
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•  Caporale and Grier 
(1998) 
•  Real Federal Funds 
rate 
•  U.S./1961 
1996/quarterly 
•  Are changes in the real Fed Funds 
rate associated with changes in 
overseer preferences (e.g., those of 
the President and leaders of 
relevant committees)? 
•  OLS 
•  Heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent t 
statistics 
•  Oversight by Republican 
presidents and relatively 
conservative Senate Banking 
Committee leadership is 




•  Corder (2006) 
•  Federal funds rate 
•  Real time or “vintage” 
data for output and 
inflation measures 
•  U.S./1965 
2005/quarterly 
•  Taylor reaction function 
•  If adjustment parameters do not 
vary as the identity of elected 
officials changes, then the 
assumption of incumbent control 
is, at best, suspect.  
•  Investigates whether the Fed 
responds more aggressively to 
inflation under a Republican 
President or if a Republican 
majority controls Congress and to a 
recession sooner and with lower 
interest rates if the President is a 
Democrat 
•  Changes in the pivotal 
legislator (Morris, 2000) rather 
than the President alone, 
appointment to the Board, or 
the Board chairman influence 
monetary policy choices 
•  Congress and the President 
jointly influence the policy 
choices of the Fed in ways 
that benefit the core 
constituencies of the major 
parties  
•  Fed is systematically more 
responsive to inflation when a 
Republican controls the White 
House and the Congress  
+ 
  
•  Falaschetti (2002) 
•  Continuous dependent 
variable Voting score: 
the percentage of times 
an FOMC member 
dissented for tighter or 
looser policy in a given 
year 
and a polychotomous 
dependent variable 
Group  
•  U.S./Panel of FOMC 
votes 1973 1997/intra 
year 
•  Conventional least squares dummy 
variable model if dependent 
variable is Voting score 
•  Multinomial logit model if 
dependent variable is Group 
•  Hypothesis 1: FRB governors who 
were nominated and confirmed by 
the same party prefer significantly 
looser monetary policy 
•  Hypothesis 2: monetary policy is 
significantly looser when either 
party controls the oversight 
mechanism (i.e., the Presient and 
the Senate) than when control is 
fixed 
•  Political agents from both 
parties prefer loose money 
•  They face lower costs to act 
on this common preference 




•  Faust and Irons (1999) 
•  Three month Treasury 
bill rate, M2(M1) 
•  U.S./ 1953 
1995/quarterly 
•  Assessment of the importance of 
political variables in traditional 
macro models and to assess the role 
of the monetary policy channel in 
accounting for any political effects 
•  Identified 4 variable VAR in order 
to avoid simultaneity bias and 
omitted variable bias 
•  Check whether partisan variables 
(intercept and slope dummies) need 
to be included in the VAR, i.e. in 
monetary policy equation 
•  Controlling for credit control and 
Bretton Woods 
•  Strong associations between 
party and aggregate measures 
of economic activity, but … 
•  Little evidence that the causal 
explanation of any political 
effects on the economy 
operates through changes in 
monetary policy 
•  Little support for the view 
that empirical monetary 




•  Galbraith, Giovannoni 
and Russo (2007) 
•  Yield curve (difference 
between 10 year 
constant maturity rate 
•  Four different versions of a Taylor 
reaction function  
•  Newey and West (1987) procedure 
using the HAC modification of the 
covariance matrix which corrects 
•  Presence of a serious partisan 
bias, at the heart of the 
Federal Reserve’s 
policymaking process. 
•  When a Republican 





•  Effect of left labor power on 
macroeconomic policy conditioned 
upon the degree of trade, capital 
market openness, the degree of 
capital market liberalization and the 
exchange rate regime 
power coefficients 
insignificant 
•  Pure left labor power, 
however, significant with a 
positive sign. 
   
•  Cusack (2001) 
•  Discount rate 
•  14 OECD 
countries/1961 
1994/annual 
•  Taylor rule specification 
•  OLS with panel corrected standard 
errors 
•  Checking for the role of 
partisanship as contingent on the 
independence of the central bank 
and of political non neutrality of 
central bank decision makers 
•  Pooled cross section time series 
design 
•  Little support for the view 
that central bank 
independence inhibits partisan 
influences  
•  Support for the thesis that 




•  Mukherjee and Singer 
(2008) 
•  Inflation target: 
dichotomous measure 
that takes the value of 
1 if a country has 
formally adopted a 
numerical target for 
inflation, and 0 
otherwise 
•  78 countries/1987 
2003/annual 
•  Spatial AR probit model on  entire 
sample of countries  
•  Divide global sample into OECD 
and non OECD subsamples and 
test hypotheses within each group 
•  Drop all twelve Eurozone countries 
from sample from 1999 onward 
•  Likelihood that an inflation 
targeting regime is adopted will 
increase under a right leaning 
government if the central bank 
does not have bank regulatory 
responsibilities 
•  Combined effect of a right 
wing incumbent and a 
nonregulatory central bank 
increases the likelihood of 




•  Sakamoto (2008) 
•  Cyclically adjusted 
monetary policy stance 
by central banks 
(discount rates minus 
Taylor rule implied 
discount rates) 
•  18 industrial 
democracies/1961 
2001/annual 
•  Dynamic panel regressions of (the 
level of) monetary policy stance on 
(the level of) political economic 
variables and economic controls 
•  OLS estimates with panel corrected 
standard errors and country and 
period dummies 
•  Separate regressions for 1961 
1981/1982 2001/1961 2001 
•  Check for significance of three 
separate government partisanship 
variables which measure cabinet 
portfolios and, additionally, of … 
•   the same variables interacted with 
an indicator of central bank 
independence 
•  Monetary policy under left 
governments is loose 
•  Monetary policy under right 
governments might be tight 
•  Combination of left 
governments with 
independent central bank 
produces tight monetary 
policy 
•  Combination of right 
governments with 
independent central bank 





•  Abrams and Iossifov 
(2006) 
•  Quarterly average of 
the Federal Funds Rate 
•  U.S./ 1957 
2004/quarterly 
•  Taylor reaction function with 
interest rate smooting 
•  OLS and White correction for 
heteroskedasticity 
•  Plus unreported GMM 
•  Check whether the Fed establishes 
an abnormally expansionary 
monetary policy in the run up to 
the presidential election, but only if 
the incumbent president or party is 
from the party that initially 
appointed the Fed chair. 
•  Party affiliation of Federal 
Reserve chairmen matters for 
the monetary policy stance  
•  Finding of a partisan based 
opportunistic political 





and the output gap. The parameters ϕ and φ in equation (1) reflect the long run weight of the 
variables output gap and the inflation rate, respectively, while the parameter ρ describes the 
extent of interest rate smoothing chosen by monetary policy. Following the related studies on 
Taylor Rule specifications, the money market rate is used to approximate the relevant policy rate. 
As usual, we base our output gap and inflation rate variables on time series which are measured 
ex post for period t.  
In  practice,  it  is  usually observed  that,  especially since  the  early 1990s,  central  banks 
worldwide tend to move policy interest rates in small steps without reversing their direction 
quickly (Amato and Laubach 1999, Castelnuovo 2003, and Rudebusch 2002). To incorporate this 
pattern of interest rate smoothing, the Taylor rule itself is viewed as the mechanism by which the 
target interest rate is determined. The actual interest rate partially adjusts to this target according 
to  ( ) 1 * 1 − ⋅ + ⋅ − = t t i i i ρ ρ , where ρ is the smoothing parameter. For this reason, our panel data 
model has the following appearance: 
 
(1)  Short term interest rateit =  α Ideologyit + β CBDit + γ Ideologyit*CBDit  
+ φ Inflationit + ϕ Output gapit + ρ Short term interest rateit 1 
+ ηi + εt + uit                                              
 
with i=1,…,15; t=1,…,104, 
where the dependent variable Short term interest rateit denotes the short term nominal 
interest rate. Ideologyit describes the ideological orientation of the respective government and 
                                                                                                                                                          
output gap also calls for a tightening in the Fed’s policy stance (i.e., an increase in the Federal Funds Rate) as the 
positive output gap is unsustainable without incurring acceleration in the inflation rate. 
Accumulated evidence that the Fed reacts to inflation and unemployment considerations is hardly surprising, but 
the consistency over time of the apparent implicit or explicit adherence to a Taylor rule over a wide range of 
targeting procedures (e.g., monetary aggregates or interest rates) is striking (Orphanides 2003). Orphanides (2003), p. 
984, notes that this historical consistency makes the Taylor rule a “useful organizing device for interpreting past 
policy decisions and mistakes…”. 
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CBDit captures the degree of central bank dependence. In the next paragraphs we describe these 
variables and their coding in detail. We include the interaction term of government ideology and 
central bank dependence in order to identify potential differences between leftwing and rightwing 
governments facing high central bank dependence. As mentioned above, we follow the related 
literature on Taylor rule specifications by including the inflation rate (Inflationit), the output gap 
(Output  gapit),  and  the  lagged  dependent  variable  (Short  term  interest  rateit 1).  Finally,  ηi 
represents a (potential) fixed country effect, εt is a fixed period effect and uit describes an error 
term – all with the usual properties.  
Variables 
Ideology variable (“Ideology”) 
An important challenge for testing the impact of government ideology in an OECD panel 
is  the  heterogeneity  of  the  parties  and  parliamentary  systems  in  the  individual  nation  states. 
Hence, the question is which governments should be labeled leftwing or rightwing – especially 
when there are more than two parties in the government with different ideological roots. We 
employ  the  government  ideology  index  by  Potrafke  (2009).  It  is  based  on  the  index  on 
governments’  ideological  positions  by  Budge  et  al.  (1993)  which  has  been  updated  by 
Woldendorp et al. (1998, 2000). This index places the cabinet on a left right scale with values 
between 1 and 5. It takes the value 1 if the share of governing rightwing parties in terms of seats 
in the cabinet and in parliament is larger than 2/3, and 2 if it is between 1/3 and 2/3. The index 
is 3 if the share of centre parties is 50 percent, or if the leftwing and rightwing parties form a 
coalition government not dominated by one side or the other. The index is symmetric and takes 
the values 4 and 5 if the leftwing parties dominate. Adopting this classification, Potrafke (2009) 
introduces an index for the examined countries in the period till the beginning of this millenium. 
Potrafke’s  (2009)  coding,  however,  explicitly  refers  to  the  left right scale  of  the  parties. This 
indicator is consistent across time but does not attempt to capture differences between the party 
families across countries. Quarters in which the government changed are labelled according to 
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Supporting evidence    
Panel data studies    
•  Alesina, Roubini and 
Cohen (1997) 
•  Yearly rate change of 
M1, short  and long 
term interest rates and 
real interest rates 
•  OECD countries, 
democracies/1960 
1993 and without 
Bretton Woods: 1973 
1993/quarterly 
•  OLS panel estimation 
•  Search for permanent partisan 
effects (all instruments) and 
temporary partisan effects (real 
interest rate) 
•  Growth rate of the money supply 
and the level of short  and long 
term interest rates should be higher 
(lower) during a leftwing 
administration. 
•  Money growth rates (short  
and long run interest rates) 
are higher (lower) during a 
leftwing administration.  
•  Steady state: yearly difference 
in the money supply growth 
rate (short run interest rate 
,long run interest rate) 
between a left  and a right 
wing administration is around 
2.4 (2.5, 3.0) percent. 
•  But no temporary rational 




•  Bearce (2003) 
•  Indicator of monetary 
policy autonomy 
measured in terms of 
an interest rate 
differential vis à vis the 
rest of the world 
•  22 OECD 
countries/1975 
1992/annual 
•  Panel estimation 
•  Beck/Katz (1996) estimation 
technique correcting for both panel 
heteroskedasticity and spatial 
(contemporaneous) autocorrelation. 
•  Prais Winsten coefficients with 
panel corrected standard errors 
(PCSE) 
•  Leftist (rightist) governments, 
representing the domestically 
oriented (internationally oriented) 
groups in society, should be 
associated with more (less) 
monetary autonomy. 
•  Leftist led govemments opt 
for greater monetary 
autonomy, as demanded by 
their domestically oriented 
societal principals, than would 
be expected given current 
business cycle conditions. 
•  Sectoral and factoral monetary 
policy preferences'" do matter 
for monetary and exchange 
rate policy outcomes 
+ 
  
•  Boix (2000) 
•  Short term real interest 
rate (government bond 
yields) 
•  19 OECD 
countries/1960 
1993/annual  
•  Pooled cross sectional time series 
model through the Beck Katz 
(1996) method of ordinary least 
squares, adjusting the standard 
errors for unequal variation within 
panels  
•  Introducing a lagged endogenous 
variable and correcting for 
autocorrelation. 
•  Socialist control of government is 
calculated as SC*(l CBl) 
•  The interactive term 
SOC*LABORG measures the 
presence of social democratic 
corporatist regimes, that is, socialist 
governments 
•  Monetary policy did not vary 
as a result of partisanship 
alone but it required the 
presence of some kind of 




•  Clark (2003) 
•  Interest rate 
•  14 OECD countries if 
conditioning is on 
degree of trade 
openness or capital 
market openness, 12 
•  OLS panel estimation according to 
Beck and Katz (1996) without 
Prais Winsten correction, since no 
evidence of serial correlation 
•  Regression equation includes 
additional control variables 
expected to influence monetary 
•  Left labor power coefficients 
conditional on degree of trade 
and on capital market 
openness  significant with the 
expected negative sign. 
+ 
•  Other conditional left labor 
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the government that was in office for a longer period. It is important to note that our way of 
coding of the ideology variable gives rise to the expectation that short term interest rates vary negatively 
with the ideology index. Hence, we expect the estimated coefficient α in eq. (1) to display a negative 
sign.  
 
Central bank dependence variable (CBD) 
Government ideology is only expected to influence short term interest rates when central 
banks are subject to directives. The common empirical indicators, however, measure central bank 
independence rather than central bank dependence. In order to be in line with the coding of our 
ideology  index,  our  framework  requires  an empirical  indicator  that  increases with  central bank 
dependence. This interaction term of an increasing ideology (leftwing government) and central bank 
dependence is expected to have a negative impact on short term interest rates. For this reason, we apply 
the inverse of a central bank independence indicator. Here, we use the overall index developed by 
Klomp and De Haan (2008) that is time variant and takes on values between 0 and 1 (total CBI 
turnover).
12    Klomp  and  De  Haan  (2008)  use  the  scores  of  Arnone  et  al.  (2007)  and  the 
assignment of the CBI values across the years by Acemoglu et al. (2008). Moreover, they calculate 
CBI turnover on the basis of the data delivered by Dreher, Sturm and De Haan (2008). In 
accordance with partisan theory, we expect a negative sign of the estimated coefficient β of the 
CBD variable in eq. (1).  
 
Interaction variable 
We finally include the interaction term Ideologyit*CBDit, in order to examine the effect of 
government  ideology  conditional  on  different  values  for  central  bank  dependence  (Friedrich 
1982). We normalize both interacted variables (mean zero, variance one), so that we can directly 
interpret the coefficients and marginal effects across the specifications. The estimated coefficient 
                                                 
12
 For a discussion on the definition of central bank independence see, for example, Hayo and Hefeker (2002) and 
Siklos (2008). -16- 
 
of the interaction term between ideology and central bank dependence is also expected to be 
negative. 
Estimation method 
We now turn to discussing our choice of the panel data estimation methods. First, we 
implement heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) Newey West type (Newey and 
West  1987)  standard  errors  and  variance covariance  estimates,  because  the  Wooldridge  test 
(Wooldridge 2002, pp. 176 177) for serial correlation in the idiosyncratic errors of a linear panel 
data  model  implies  the  existence  of  arbitrary  serial  correlation.  Moreover,  in  the  context  of 
dynamic estimation, the common fixed effect estimator is generally biased. It is important to note 
that the Nickell Bias with size 1/T is ignorable in our case with T equal to about 100 and that the 





4.  Estimation Results 
 
Table 3 illustrates the regression results for the basic Taylor rule specification and reports 
the  coefficients  and  t statistics  (in  absolute  terms)  for  every  single  equation.  Compared  to  a 
regression with a common constant, we can reject the null hypothesis of the F Test that all the 
fixed time and country effects are zero. Furthermore, we cannot reject the Hausman Test in 
favour of the random effects model. Hence, in this case, the random effects estimator is efficient as 
well as consistent. Columns (3) and (4) refer to the model including a lagged dependent variable.  
The control variables display the expected sign and their impact is robust across the 
different econometric specifications in columns (1) and (2), and (3) and (4), respectively. The 
positive impact of the inflation rate and the output gap are in line with the theoretical predictions of the 
Taylor rule. Our results in columns (1) and (2) suggest that the short term interest rate increases by 
about two points when the inflation rate increases by one point and the short term interest rate 
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increases by about 0.05 points when the output gap increases by about one point. It is important 
to note that the general Taylor rule theoretically predicts the impact of the inflation rate on the 
short term nominal interest as 1.5 and the impact of output gap on the short term nominal 
interest rate as 0.5.
13 The numerical impact of the inflation rate suggested by our empirical model, 
however, dramatically drops down (as is well known from other studies of the Taylor rule) when 
the lagged dependent variable is included, although the coefficient of the inflation rate remains 
statistically highly significant. The lagged dependent variable is highly statistically significant itself 
and its coefficients imply that short term nominal interest rates are strongly persistent. Overall, 
our specification of the Taylor reaction function provides a suitable benchmark for our further 
investigations.  
Table 4 reports the regression results when the ideology variable is included. The impact of 
the ideology variable dramatically differs depending on the inclusion of the lagged dependent 
variable. The regression in column (1) without a lagged dependent variable suggests that central 
banks if opposed to a leftist government strongly raised short term interest rates. The coefficient 
implies  that  an  increase  of  the  ideology  variable  by  one  point  –  say  from  3  (leftwing  and 
rightwing parties in government) to 4 (leftwing government) – increases the short term nominal 
interest rate by about 0.37 points. This effect vanishes when the lagged dependent variable is 
included.  In  any  case,  the  basic  result  that  central  banks  which  are  accompanied  by  leftist 
governments implemented a restrictive monetary policy directly contradicts the implications of 
the partisan theory at first glance.  
This potential impact of government ideology on monetary policy, however, has to be 
validated by the interaction with central bank dependence. Table 5 illustrates the results of the 
                                                 
13 Since it is the real interest rate which actually drives private decisions, the size of φ  needs to assure that – as a 
response to a rise in inflation – the nominal interest rate is raised sufficiently to actually increase the real interest rate. 
This so called Taylor principle implies that the coefficient φ has to be larger than one (Taylor 1999, and Clarida, Galí 
and Gertler 1998). If not, self fulfilling bursts of inflation may be possible (see e.g., Bernanke and Woodford 1997, 
Clarida, Galí and Gertler 1998, 2000, Woodford 2001). For monetary policy to have a stabilising impact on output, a 
less restrictive condition has to be fulfilled, i.e. ϕ is expected to be positive.  
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model including government ideology, central bank dependence and its interaction. Column (1) 
refers to the model without a lagged dependent variable whereas the lagged dependent variable is 
included in the specification (2).  
The marginal effects of the ideology variable have to be interpreted conditionally on the 
interaction with central bank dependence. In principle, there are two sensible ways to evaluate the 
marginal effects (Jaccard and Turrisi 2003). We follow Dreher and Gassebner (2007), evaluating 
the marginal effects at the minimum as well as the maximum of the interacted variable, i.e. central 
bank  dependence.  Using  this  method  we  are  able  to  distinguish  between  the  impacts  of 
government ideology on short term interest rates when central bank dependence was high and 
low. Alternatively, one can choose to evaluate the marginal effects at the average level of central 
bank dependence. Table 6 implies that interpreting the marginal effect of government ideology at 
the  average  level  of  central  bank  dependence  perfectly  corresponds  with  the  simple  models 
reported in Table 4. Central banks if joined by leftist governments are suggested to increase short 
term nominal interest rates (column 1, model without lagged dependent variable). This finding is 
in line with previous results by Boix (2000), Clark (2003) and Sakamoto (2008). The marginal 
effects presented in Table 6 can be interpreted as follows: At the average level of central bank 
dependence  an  increase  of  the  ideology  variable  by  one  point  –  say  from  3  (leftwing  and 
rightwing parties in government) to 4 (leftwing government) – increases the short term nominal 
interest rate by about 0.23 points (column 1). In contrast, the results suggest that government 
ideology had no effect on short term nominal interest rates when central bank dependence was 
high, i.e. at its maximum. Government ideology (leftwing) has had a statistically strongly significant 
positive impact on short term nominal interest rates when central bank dependence was low, i.e. 
at its minimum. 
We  have  examined  the  robustness  of  our  results  in  several  ways.  For  example,  the 
reported effects could be driven or mitigated by idiosyncratic circumstances in the individual 
countries. We have therefore tested whether the results are sensitive to the inclusion/exclusion of 
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particular countries. The marginal effect of government ideology at a maximum level of central 
bank  dependence  turns  to  be  negative  but  still  statistically  insignificant  when  Iceland,  New 
Zealand and Sweden are excluded. Hence leftist governments did not appear to have pursued 
expansionary monetary policies in these countries. In contrast, the marginal effect appears to be 
positive but still statically insignificant in specification (2) when Ireland and Japan are excluded. 
Furthermore,  the  overall  positive  impact  of  leftist  governments  on  the  short term  nominal 
interest  rate  in  the  model  without  lagged  dependent  variable  is  not  sensitive  to  the 
inclusion/exclusion of particular countries.  
As a further robustness test, we have estimated sub samples to address sovereignty losses 
in monetary policy of the Eurozone countries after 1999 due to the European monetary Union 
(EMU).  Our  inferences  do  not  change  at  all  compared  to  Table  6,  when  we  estimate,  for 
example, our models for the period 1980.1. to 1998.4.  
 
 
5.  Discussion 
The result that short term nominal interest rates were higher under leftist governments is 
highly  compatible  with  the  findings  by  Sakamoto  (2008:  215).  He  comes  to  the  following 
conclusion: Leftist governments “had to move their economic policies farther away from their 
traditional  positions  toward  the  right  to  make  their  policy  more  market conforming.  This 
potential  for  policy  conflict  led  them  to  seek  to  make  a  market conforming  policy  shift  by 
delegating monetary policy to central banks (Bernhard, 2002). They used independent central 
banks to make a neoliberal policy shift and fiscal austerity palatable to their pro intervention and 
pro welfare constituencies.”  
In a similar vein, (Crowe 2008, p. 749) concludes that: “The motive for delegating the 
monetary  policy  decision  to  a  fully  (goal )independent  central  bank  is  that  it  removes  the 
intracoalition conflict over monetary policy from the political arena”. This interpretation of our 
results is also corresponds with Hughes Hallett (2008) who finds that, despite the rhetoric, central -20- 
 
banks  do  not  attempt  to  punish  or  discipline  fiscally  expansionary  governments.  Moreover, 
leftwing  parties  themselves  might  have an  interest in  maintaining  central bank  independence 
because a central bank that is believed to be neutral is a better 'scapegoat' for the stabilization 
recession after their expansions (Kane 1980 and Vaubel 1997a, pp. 222f.). 
The two characteristics of the traditional partisan monetary policy hypothesis   activist 
monetary policy (i.e., monetary surprises) as the driving force, and control of monetary policy by 
politicians – do not fit with central bank behavior. Countries, for which ideological cycles have 
been corroborated, as e.g. Germany, are quite often countries with highly independent central 
banks.  Hence,  the  traditional  partisan  theory  view  of  monetary  policy  as  being  dictated  by 
politicians does not appear to be convincing (Drazen 2000, pp. 95f.) and it is not validated by our 
estimation.  
According to the more traditional partisan view, a further potential explanation for our 
results  might  be  that  conservative  central  bankers  have  counteracted  any  attempts  of 
expansionary policies under leftist governments. Empirical studies on partisan effects in fiscal 
policy, however, show that rightwing governments did not pursue more restrictive fiscal policies 
than leftwing governments. It is important to note that we cannot address this issue empirically 
directly by estimating, for example, a simultaneous equation model that also includes an equation 
on fiscal policy issues. That is why we criticize the existing literature for employing annual data 
and use quarterly data instead to address the volatility of the short term nominal interest rates. 
Quarterly data on fiscal policy indicators such as government debt are not available. 
Our findings also appear to be in line with current research by Eijffinger and Hoeberichts 
(2008) who analyze the trade off between central bank independence and conservatism within 
the New Keynesian framework following Woodford (2003) and others. They conclude that the 
trade off  between  central  bank  independence  and  conservatism  still  holds  within  the  New 
Keynesian framework. Politicians should therefore realize that their attempts to downgrade a 
central bank’s independence legally and verbally will only increase its conservatism in order to 
-21- 
 
maintain the same inflationary bias and limit the central bank's degrees of freedom with respect 
to its interest rate policy. Eijffinger and Hoeberichts (2008) argue that a Thomas Becket effect is likely 
to occur after a reduction of central bank independence. According to this effect new members of 
the central bank council alter their behaviour after their appointment and, thus, become as averse 
to inflation as older members (Berger and Woitek 1997, p. 809, Goehlmann and Vaubel 2007, p. 
938). 
In conclusion, our results suggest doubt about the influence of government ideology on 
monetary policy. In fact, central banks appear to be most important policy makers in monetary 
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banks  do  not  attempt  to  punish  or  discipline  fiscally  expansionary  governments.  Moreover, 
leftwing  parties  themselves  might  have an  interest in  maintaining  central bank  independence 
because a central bank that is believed to be neutral is a better 'scapegoat' for the stabilization 
recession after their expansions (Kane 1980 and Vaubel 1997a, pp. 222f.). 
The two characteristics of the traditional partisan monetary policy hypothesis   activist 
monetary policy (i.e., monetary surprises) as the driving force, and control of monetary policy by 
politicians – do not fit with central bank behavior. Countries, for which ideological cycles have 
been corroborated, as e.g. Germany, are quite often countries with highly independent central 
banks.  Hence,  the  traditional  partisan  theory  view  of  monetary  policy  as  being  dictated  by 
politicians does not appear to be convincing (Drazen 2000, pp. 95f.) and it is not validated by our 
estimation.  
According to the more traditional partisan view, a further potential explanation for our 
results  might  be  that  conservative  central  bankers  have  counteracted  any  attempts  of 
expansionary policies under leftist governments. Empirical studies on partisan effects in fiscal 
policy, however, show that rightwing governments did not pursue more restrictive fiscal policies 
than leftwing governments. It is important to note that we cannot address this issue empirically 
directly by estimating, for example, a simultaneous equation model that also includes an equation 
on fiscal policy issues. That is why we criticize the existing literature for employing annual data 
and use quarterly data instead to address the volatility of the short term nominal interest rates. 
Quarterly data on fiscal policy indicators such as government debt are not available. 
Our findings also appear to be in line with current research by Eijffinger and Hoeberichts 
(2008) who analyze the trade off between central bank independence and conservatism within 
the New Keynesian framework following Woodford (2003) and others. They conclude that the 
trade off  between  central  bank  independence  and  conservatism  still  holds  within  the  New 
Keynesian framework. Politicians should therefore realize that their attempts to downgrade a 
central bank’s independence legally and verbally will only increase its conservatism in order to 
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maintain the same inflationary bias and limit the central bank's degrees of freedom with respect 
to its interest rate policy. Eijffinger and Hoeberichts (2008) argue that a Thomas Becket effect is likely 
to occur after a reduction of central bank independence. According to this effect new members of 
the central bank council alter their behaviour after their appointment and, thus, become as averse 
to inflation as older members (Berger and Woitek 1997, p. 809, Goehlmann and Vaubel 2007, p. 
938). 
In conclusion, our results suggest doubt about the influence of government ideology on 
monetary policy. In fact, central banks appear to be most important policy makers in monetary 
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particular countries. The marginal effect of government ideology at a maximum level of central 
bank  dependence  turns  to  be  negative  but  still  statistically  insignificant  when  Iceland,  New 
Zealand and Sweden are excluded. Hence leftist governments did not appear to have pursued 
expansionary monetary policies in these countries. In contrast, the marginal effect appears to be 
positive but still statically insignificant in specification (2) when Ireland and Japan are excluded. 
Furthermore,  the  overall  positive  impact  of  leftist  governments  on  the  short term  nominal 
interest  rate  in  the  model  without  lagged  dependent  variable  is  not  sensitive  to  the 
inclusion/exclusion of particular countries.  
As a further robustness test, we have estimated sub samples to address sovereignty losses 
in monetary policy of the Eurozone countries after 1999 due to the European monetary Union 
(EMU).  Our  inferences  do  not  change  at  all  compared  to  Table  6,  when  we  estimate,  for 
example, our models for the period 1980.1. to 1998.4.  
 
 
5.  Discussion 
The result that short term nominal interest rates were higher under leftist governments is 
highly  compatible  with  the  findings  by  Sakamoto  (2008:  215).  He  comes  to  the  following 
conclusion: Leftist governments “had to move their economic policies farther away from their 
traditional  positions  toward  the  right  to  make  their  policy  more  market conforming.  This 
potential  for  policy  conflict  led  them  to  seek  to  make  a  market conforming  policy  shift  by 
delegating monetary policy to central banks (Bernhard, 2002). They used independent central 
banks to make a neoliberal policy shift and fiscal austerity palatable to their pro intervention and 
pro welfare constituencies.”  
In a similar vein, (Crowe 2008, p. 749) concludes that: “The motive for delegating the 
monetary  policy  decision  to  a  fully  (goal )independent  central  bank  is  that  it  removes  the 
intracoalition conflict over monetary policy from the political arena”. This interpretation of our 
results is also corresponds with Hughes Hallett (2008) who finds that, despite the rhetoric, central -18- 
 
model including government ideology, central bank dependence and its interaction. Column (1) 
refers to the model without a lagged dependent variable whereas the lagged dependent variable is 
included in the specification (2).  
The marginal effects of the ideology variable have to be interpreted conditionally on the 
interaction with central bank dependence. In principle, there are two sensible ways to evaluate the 
marginal effects (Jaccard and Turrisi 2003). We follow Dreher and Gassebner (2007), evaluating 
the marginal effects at the minimum as well as the maximum of the interacted variable, i.e. central 
bank  dependence.  Using  this  method  we  are  able  to  distinguish  between  the  impacts  of 
government ideology on short term interest rates when central bank dependence was high and 
low. Alternatively, one can choose to evaluate the marginal effects at the average level of central 
bank dependence. Table 6 implies that interpreting the marginal effect of government ideology at 
the  average  level  of  central  bank  dependence  perfectly  corresponds  with  the  simple  models 
reported in Table 4. Central banks if joined by leftist governments are suggested to increase short 
term nominal interest rates (column 1, model without lagged dependent variable). This finding is 
in line with previous results by Boix (2000), Clark (2003) and Sakamoto (2008). The marginal 
effects presented in Table 6 can be interpreted as follows: At the average level of central bank 
dependence  an  increase  of  the  ideology  variable  by  one  point  –  say  from  3  (leftwing  and 
rightwing parties in government) to 4 (leftwing government) – increases the short term nominal 
interest rate by about 0.23 points (column 1). In contrast, the results suggest that government 
ideology had no effect on short term nominal interest rates when central bank dependence was 
high, i.e. at its maximum. Government ideology (leftwing) has had a statistically strongly significant 
positive impact on short term nominal interest rates when central bank dependence was low, i.e. 
at its minimum. 
We  have  examined  the  robustness  of  our  results  in  several  ways.  For  example,  the 
reported effects could be driven or mitigated by idiosyncratic circumstances in the individual 
countries. We have therefore tested whether the results are sensitive to the inclusion/exclusion of 
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increases by about 0.05 points when the output gap increases by about one point. It is important 
to note that the general Taylor rule theoretically predicts the impact of the inflation rate on the 
short term nominal interest as 1.5 and the impact of output gap on the short term nominal 
interest rate as 0.5.
13 The numerical impact of the inflation rate suggested by our empirical model, 
however, dramatically drops down (as is well known from other studies of the Taylor rule) when 
the lagged dependent variable is included, although the coefficient of the inflation rate remains 
statistically highly significant. The lagged dependent variable is highly statistically significant itself 
and its coefficients imply that short term nominal interest rates are strongly persistent. Overall, 
our specification of the Taylor reaction function provides a suitable benchmark for our further 
investigations.  
Table 4 reports the regression results when the ideology variable is included. The impact of 
the ideology variable dramatically differs depending on the inclusion of the lagged dependent 
variable. The regression in column (1) without a lagged dependent variable suggests that central 
banks if opposed to a leftist government strongly raised short term interest rates. The coefficient 
implies  that  an  increase  of  the  ideology  variable  by  one  point  –  say  from  3  (leftwing  and 
rightwing parties in government) to 4 (leftwing government) – increases the short term nominal 
interest rate by about 0.37 points. This effect vanishes when the lagged dependent variable is 
included.  In  any  case,  the  basic  result  that  central  banks  which  are  accompanied  by  leftist 
governments implemented a restrictive monetary policy directly contradicts the implications of 
the partisan theory at first glance.  
This potential impact of government ideology on monetary policy, however, has to be 
validated by the interaction with central bank dependence. Table 5 illustrates the results of the 
                                                 
13 Since it is the real interest rate which actually drives private decisions, the size of φ  needs to assure that – as a 
response to a rise in inflation – the nominal interest rate is raised sufficiently to actually increase the real interest rate. 
This so called Taylor principle implies that the coefficient φ has to be larger than one (Taylor 1999, and Clarida, Galí 
and Gertler 1998). If not, self fulfilling bursts of inflation may be possible (see e.g., Bernanke and Woodford 1997, 
Clarida, Galí and Gertler 1998, 2000, Woodford 2001). For monetary policy to have a stabilising impact on output, a 
less restrictive condition has to be fulfilled, i.e. ϕ is expected to be positive.  
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of the interaction term between ideology and central bank dependence is also expected to be 
negative. 
Estimation method 
We now turn to discussing our choice of the panel data estimation methods. First, we 
implement heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) Newey West type (Newey and 
West  1987)  standard  errors  and  variance covariance  estimates,  because  the  Wooldridge  test 
(Wooldridge 2002, pp. 176 177) for serial correlation in the idiosyncratic errors of a linear panel 
data  model  implies  the  existence  of  arbitrary  serial  correlation.  Moreover,  in  the  context  of 
dynamic estimation, the common fixed effect estimator is generally biased. It is important to note 
that the Nickell Bias with size 1/T is ignorable in our case with T equal to about 100 and that the 





4.  Estimation Results 
 
Table 3 illustrates the regression results for the basic Taylor rule specification and reports 
the  coefficients  and  t statistics  (in  absolute  terms)  for  every  single  equation.  Compared  to  a 
regression with a common constant, we can reject the null hypothesis of the F Test that all the 
fixed time and country effects are zero. Furthermore, we cannot reject the Hausman Test in 
favour of the random effects model. Hence, in this case, the random effects estimator is efficient as 
well as consistent. Columns (3) and (4) refer to the model including a lagged dependent variable.  
The control variables display the expected sign and their impact is robust across the 
different econometric specifications in columns (1) and (2), and (3) and (4), respectively. The 
positive impact of the inflation rate and the output gap are in line with the theoretical predictions of the 
Taylor rule. Our results in columns (1) and (2) suggest that the short term interest rate increases by 
about two points when the inflation rate increases by one point and the short term interest rate 
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the government that was in office for a longer period. It is important to note that our way of 
coding of the ideology variable gives rise to the expectation that short term interest rates vary negatively 
with the ideology index. Hence, we expect the estimated coefficient α in eq. (1) to display a negative 
sign.  
 
Central bank dependence variable (CBD) 
Government ideology is only expected to influence short term interest rates when central 
banks are subject to directives. The common empirical indicators, however, measure central bank 
independence rather than central bank dependence. In order to be in line with the coding of our 
ideology  index,  our  framework  requires  an empirical  indicator  that  increases with  central bank 
dependence. This interaction term of an increasing ideology (leftwing government) and central bank 
dependence is expected to have a negative impact on short term interest rates. For this reason, we apply 
the inverse of a central bank independence indicator. Here, we use the overall index developed by 
Klomp and De Haan (2008) that is time variant and takes on values between 0 and 1 (total CBI 
turnover).
12    Klomp  and  De  Haan  (2008)  use  the  scores  of  Arnone  et  al.  (2007)  and  the 
assignment of the CBI values across the years by Acemoglu et al. (2008). Moreover, they calculate 
CBI turnover on the basis of the data delivered by Dreher, Sturm and De Haan (2008). In 
accordance with partisan theory, we expect a negative sign of the estimated coefficient β of the 
CBD variable in eq. (1).  
 
Interaction variable 
We finally include the interaction term Ideologyit*CBDit, in order to examine the effect of 
government  ideology  conditional  on  different  values  for  central  bank  dependence  (Friedrich 
1982). We normalize both interacted variables (mean zero, variance one), so that we can directly 
interpret the coefficients and marginal effects across the specifications. The estimated coefficient 
                                                 
12
 For a discussion on the definition of central bank independence see, for example, Hayo and Hefeker (2002) and 
Siklos (2008). -14- 
 
CBDit captures the degree of central bank dependence. In the next paragraphs we describe these 
variables and their coding in detail. We include the interaction term of government ideology and 
central bank dependence in order to identify potential differences between leftwing and rightwing 
governments facing high central bank dependence. As mentioned above, we follow the related 
literature on Taylor rule specifications by including the inflation rate (Inflationit), the output gap 
(Output  gapit),  and  the  lagged  dependent  variable  (Short  term  interest  rateit 1).  Finally,  ηi 
represents a (potential) fixed country effect, εt is a fixed period effect and uit describes an error 
term – all with the usual properties.  
Variables 
Ideology variable (“Ideology”) 
An important challenge for testing the impact of government ideology in an OECD panel 
is  the  heterogeneity  of  the  parties  and  parliamentary  systems  in  the  individual  nation  states. 
Hence, the question is which governments should be labeled leftwing or rightwing – especially 
when there are more than two parties in the government with different ideological roots. We 
employ  the  government  ideology  index  by  Potrafke  (2009).  It  is  based  on  the  index  on 
governments’  ideological  positions  by  Budge  et  al.  (1993)  which  has  been  updated  by 
Woldendorp et al. (1998, 2000). This index places the cabinet on a left right scale with values 
between 1 and 5. It takes the value 1 if the share of governing rightwing parties in terms of seats 
in the cabinet and in parliament is larger than 2/3, and 2 if it is between 1/3 and 2/3. The index 
is 3 if the share of centre parties is 50 percent, or if the leftwing and rightwing parties form a 
coalition government not dominated by one side or the other. The index is symmetric and takes 
the values 4 and 5 if the leftwing parties dominate. Adopting this classification, Potrafke (2009) 
introduces an index for the examined countries in the period till the beginning of this millenium. 
Potrafke’s  (2009)  coding,  however,  explicitly  refers  to  the  left right scale  of  the  parties. This 
indicator is consistent across time but does not attempt to capture differences between the party 
families across countries. Quarters in which the government changed are labelled according to 
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Supporting evidence    
Panel data studies    
•  Alesina, Roubini and 
Cohen (1997) 
•  Yearly rate change of 
M1, short  and long 
term interest rates and 
real interest rates 
•  OECD countries, 
democracies/1960 
1993 and without 
Bretton Woods: 1973 
1993/quarterly 
•  OLS panel estimation 
•  Search for permanent partisan 
effects (all instruments) and 
temporary partisan effects (real 
interest rate) 
•  Growth rate of the money supply 
and the level of short  and long 
term interest rates should be higher 
(lower) during a leftwing 
administration. 
•  Money growth rates (short  
and long run interest rates) 
are higher (lower) during a 
leftwing administration.  
•  Steady state: yearly difference 
in the money supply growth 
rate (short run interest rate 
,long run interest rate) 
between a left  and a right 
wing administration is around 
2.4 (2.5, 3.0) percent. 
•  But no temporary rational 




•  Bearce (2003) 
•  Indicator of monetary 
policy autonomy 
measured in terms of 
an interest rate 
differential vis à vis the 
rest of the world 
•  22 OECD 
countries/1975 
1992/annual 
•  Panel estimation 
•  Beck/Katz (1996) estimation 
technique correcting for both panel 
heteroskedasticity and spatial 
(contemporaneous) autocorrelation. 
•  Prais Winsten coefficients with 
panel corrected standard errors 
(PCSE) 
•  Leftist (rightist) governments, 
representing the domestically 
oriented (internationally oriented) 
groups in society, should be 
associated with more (less) 
monetary autonomy. 
•  Leftist led govemments opt 
for greater monetary 
autonomy, as demanded by 
their domestically oriented 
societal principals, than would 
be expected given current 
business cycle conditions. 
•  Sectoral and factoral monetary 
policy preferences'" do matter 
for monetary and exchange 
rate policy outcomes 
+ 
  
•  Boix (2000) 
•  Short term real interest 
rate (government bond 
yields) 
•  19 OECD 
countries/1960 
1993/annual  
•  Pooled cross sectional time series 
model through the Beck Katz 
(1996) method of ordinary least 
squares, adjusting the standard 
errors for unequal variation within 
panels  
•  Introducing a lagged endogenous 
variable and correcting for 
autocorrelation. 
•  Socialist control of government is 
calculated as SC*(l CBl) 
•  The interactive term 
SOC*LABORG measures the 
presence of social democratic 
corporatist regimes, that is, socialist 
governments 
•  Monetary policy did not vary 
as a result of partisanship 
alone but it required the 
presence of some kind of 




•  Clark (2003) 
•  Interest rate 
•  14 OECD countries if 
conditioning is on 
degree of trade 
openness or capital 
market openness, 12 
•  OLS panel estimation according to 
Beck and Katz (1996) without 
Prais Winsten correction, since no 
evidence of serial correlation 
•  Regression equation includes 
additional control variables 
expected to influence monetary 
•  Left labor power coefficients 
conditional on degree of trade 
and on capital market 
openness  significant with the 
expected negative sign. 
+ 
•  Other conditional left labor 





•  Effect of left labor power on 
macroeconomic policy conditioned 
upon the degree of trade, capital 
market openness, the degree of 
capital market liberalization and the 
exchange rate regime 
power coefficients 
insignificant 
•  Pure left labor power, 
however, significant with a 
positive sign. 
   
•  Cusack (2001) 
•  Discount rate 
•  14 OECD 
countries/1961 
1994/annual 
•  Taylor rule specification 
•  OLS with panel corrected standard 
errors 
•  Checking for the role of 
partisanship as contingent on the 
independence of the central bank 
and of political non neutrality of 
central bank decision makers 
•  Pooled cross section time series 
design 
•  Little support for the view 
that central bank 
independence inhibits partisan 
influences  
•  Support for the thesis that 




•  Mukherjee and Singer 
(2008) 
•  Inflation target: 
dichotomous measure 
that takes the value of 
1 if a country has 
formally adopted a 
numerical target for 
inflation, and 0 
otherwise 
•  78 countries/1987 
2003/annual 
•  Spatial AR probit model on  entire 
sample of countries  
•  Divide global sample into OECD 
and non OECD subsamples and 
test hypotheses within each group 
•  Drop all twelve Eurozone countries 
from sample from 1999 onward 
•  Likelihood that an inflation 
targeting regime is adopted will 
increase under a right leaning 
government if the central bank 
does not have bank regulatory 
responsibilities 
•  Combined effect of a right 
wing incumbent and a 
nonregulatory central bank 
increases the likelihood of 




•  Sakamoto (2008) 
•  Cyclically adjusted 
monetary policy stance 
by central banks 
(discount rates minus 
Taylor rule implied 
discount rates) 
•  18 industrial 
democracies/1961 
2001/annual 
•  Dynamic panel regressions of (the 
level of) monetary policy stance on 
(the level of) political economic 
variables and economic controls 
•  OLS estimates with panel corrected 
standard errors and country and 
period dummies 
•  Separate regressions for 1961 
1981/1982 2001/1961 2001 
•  Check for significance of three 
separate government partisanship 
variables which measure cabinet 
portfolios and, additionally, of … 
•   the same variables interacted with 
an indicator of central bank 
independence 
•  Monetary policy under left 
governments is loose 
•  Monetary policy under right 
governments might be tight 
•  Combination of left 
governments with 
independent central bank 
produces tight monetary 
policy 
•  Combination of right 
governments with 
independent central bank 





•  Abrams and Iossifov 
(2006) 
•  Quarterly average of 
the Federal Funds Rate 
•  U.S./ 1957 
2004/quarterly 
•  Taylor reaction function with 
interest rate smooting 
•  OLS and White correction for 
heteroskedasticity 
•  Plus unreported GMM 
•  Check whether the Fed establishes 
an abnormally expansionary 
monetary policy in the run up to 
the presidential election, but only if 
the incumbent president or party is 
from the party that initially 
appointed the Fed chair. 
•  Party affiliation of Federal 
Reserve chairmen matters for 
the monetary policy stance  
•  Finding of a partisan based 
opportunistic political 





and the output gap. The parameters ϕ and φ in equation (1) reflect the long run weight of the 
variables output gap and the inflation rate, respectively, while the parameter ρ describes the 
extent of interest rate smoothing chosen by monetary policy. Following the related studies on 
Taylor Rule specifications, the money market rate is used to approximate the relevant policy rate. 
As usual, we base our output gap and inflation rate variables on time series which are measured 
ex post for period t.  
In  practice,  it  is  usually observed  that,  especially since  the  early 1990s,  central  banks 
worldwide tend to move policy interest rates in small steps without reversing their direction 
quickly (Amato and Laubach 1999, Castelnuovo 2003, and Rudebusch 2002). To incorporate this 
pattern of interest rate smoothing, the Taylor rule itself is viewed as the mechanism by which the 
target interest rate is determined. The actual interest rate partially adjusts to this target according 
to  ( ) 1 * 1 − ⋅ + ⋅ − = t t i i i ρ ρ , where ρ is the smoothing parameter. For this reason, our panel data 
model has the following appearance: 
 
(1)  Short term interest rateit =  α Ideologyit + β CBDit + γ Ideologyit*CBDit  
+ φ Inflationit + ϕ Output gapit + ρ Short term interest rateit 1 
+ ηi + εt + uit                                              
 
with i=1,…,15; t=1,…,104, 
where the dependent variable Short term interest rateit denotes the short term nominal 
interest rate. Ideologyit describes the ideological orientation of the respective government and 
                                                                                                                                                          
output gap also calls for a tightening in the Fed’s policy stance (i.e., an increase in the Federal Funds Rate) as the 
positive output gap is unsustainable without incurring acceleration in the inflation rate. 
Accumulated evidence that the Fed reacts to inflation and unemployment considerations is hardly surprising, but 
the consistency over time of the apparent implicit or explicit adherence to a Taylor rule over a wide range of 
targeting procedures (e.g., monetary aggregates or interest rates) is striking (Orphanides 2003). Orphanides (2003), p. 
984, notes that this historical consistency makes the Taylor rule a “useful organizing device for interpreting past 
policy decisions and mistakes…”. 
 -12- 
 
credible empirical set ups are required in order to examine whether leftist governments have 
implemented expansionary monetary policies in OECD countries. 
 
3.  Data and empirical strategy 
 
3.1 Data 
We use data provided by the OECD Economic Indicators (2008). The data set contains 
quarterly  data  for  short  term  nominal  interest  rates  of  potentially  23  OECD  countries.  The 
countries included are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece,  Iceland,  Ireland,  Italy,  Japan,  Luxembourg,  the  Netherlands,  New  Zealand,  Norway, 
Portugal,  Spain,  Sweden,  Switzerland,  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  USA.  The  potential 
observation period runs from 1970.1 to 2007.4. The time dimension of our panel, however, is 
strongly  diminished  due  to  missing  quarterly  data  on  the  output  gap  and  on  central  bank 
independence. Hence, we end up with a panel containing 15 OECD countries in the period 
1980.1 to 2005.4. The countries included in this sample are Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden 
and the USA. Figure 1 illustrates the short term nominal interest rates and Table 2 provides the 
descriptive statistics of the variables and the respective data sources.  
 
3.2 The empirical model and variables 
Empirical model  
We start from the usual baseline specification of the Taylor rule concept.
11 The variables 
included in this specification usually are the short term interest rate, the domestic inflation rate 
                                                 
11 Taylor (1993a,b) has shown that the actual monetary policy stance of the U.S. Federal Reserve, as measured by 
the level of the federal funds rate (the overnight inter bank lending rate), is well emulated by a simple rule, based on 
two macroeconomic variables: the deviations of the rate of inflation from its target (usually assumed to be 2 percent) 
and the output gap (the percentage deviation of real GDP from its potential value under the assumption of full 
employment). This is consistent with the Fed’s objectives “to promote effectively the goals of maximum 
employment, stable prices, and moderate long term interest rates” (BGFRS, 1994). Other things equal, a rise in the 
inflation rate calls for a tightening of the Fed’s policy stance (i.e., an increase in the Federal Funds Rate). A rise in the 
-29- 
 
•  Caporale and Grier 
(1998) 
•  Real Federal Funds 
rate 
•  U.S./1961 
1996/quarterly 
•  Are changes in the real Fed Funds 
rate associated with changes in 
overseer preferences (e.g., those of 
the President and leaders of 
relevant committees)? 
•  OLS 
•  Heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent t 
statistics 
•  Oversight by Republican 
presidents and relatively 
conservative Senate Banking 
Committee leadership is 




•  Corder (2006) 
•  Federal funds rate 
•  Real time or “vintage” 
data for output and 
inflation measures 
•  U.S./1965 
2005/quarterly 
•  Taylor reaction function 
•  If adjustment parameters do not 
vary as the identity of elected 
officials changes, then the 
assumption of incumbent control 
is, at best, suspect.  
•  Investigates whether the Fed 
responds more aggressively to 
inflation under a Republican 
President or if a Republican 
majority controls Congress and to a 
recession sooner and with lower 
interest rates if the President is a 
Democrat 
•  Changes in the pivotal 
legislator (Morris, 2000) rather 
than the President alone, 
appointment to the Board, or 
the Board chairman influence 
monetary policy choices 
•  Congress and the President 
jointly influence the policy 
choices of the Fed in ways 
that benefit the core 
constituencies of the major 
parties  
•  Fed is systematically more 
responsive to inflation when a 
Republican controls the White 
House and the Congress  
+ 
  
•  Falaschetti (2002) 
•  Continuous dependent 
variable Voting score: 
the percentage of times 
an FOMC member 
dissented for tighter or 
looser policy in a given 
year 
and a polychotomous 
dependent variable 
Group  
•  U.S./Panel of FOMC 
votes 1973 1997/intra 
year 
•  Conventional least squares dummy 
variable model if dependent 
variable is Voting score 
•  Multinomial logit model if 
dependent variable is Group 
•  Hypothesis 1: FRB governors who 
were nominated and confirmed by 
the same party prefer significantly 
looser monetary policy 
•  Hypothesis 2: monetary policy is 
significantly looser when either 
party controls the oversight 
mechanism (i.e., the Presient and 
the Senate) than when control is 
fixed 
•  Political agents from both 
parties prefer loose money 
•  They face lower costs to act 
on this common preference 




•  Faust and Irons (1999) 
•  Three month Treasury 
bill rate, M2(M1) 
•  U.S./ 1953 
1995/quarterly 
•  Assessment of the importance of 
political variables in traditional 
macro models and to assess the role 
of the monetary policy channel in 
accounting for any political effects 
•  Identified 4 variable VAR in order 
to avoid simultaneity bias and 
omitted variable bias 
•  Check whether partisan variables 
(intercept and slope dummies) need 
to be included in the VAR, i.e. in 
monetary policy equation 
•  Controlling for credit control and 
Bretton Woods 
•  Strong associations between 
party and aggregate measures 
of economic activity, but … 
•  Little evidence that the causal 
explanation of any political 
effects on the economy 
operates through changes in 
monetary policy 
•  Little support for the view 
that empirical monetary 




•  Galbraith, Giovannoni 
and Russo (2007) 
•  Yield curve (difference 
between 10 year 
constant maturity rate 
•  Four different versions of a Taylor 
reaction function  
•  Newey and West (1987) procedure 
using the HAC modification of the 
covariance matrix which corrects 
•  Presence of a serious partisan 
bias, at the heart of the 
Federal Reserve’s 
policymaking process. 
•  When a Republican 
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and three month 
Treasury bill rate); 
movements in the term 
structure coincide 
exactly with 
movements in the 
discount rate 
•  U.S./1984 
2003/quarterly 
for heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation of unknown form. 
•  Examine whether the Federal 
Reserve’s monetary policy has 
exhibited a pattern of partisan bias 
in presidential election years 
•  Term structure is steeper and 
monetary policy more permissive in 
years when a Republican 
administration is seeking renewal 
than when it is not.  
•  Term structure will be flatter and 
monetary policy more restrictive 
in years when a Democratic 
administration is seeking renewal 
administration is in office, the 
term structure in the pre 
election year tends to be 
steeper, by values estimated at 
up to 150 basis points, and 
monetary policy is accordingly 
more permissive.  
•  When a Democratic 
administration is in office, the 
term structure tends to be 
flatter, by values also 
estimated at up to 150 basis 
points, and monetary policy is 
more restrictive. 
•  Federal Reserve systematically 
alters the term structure of 
interest rates, in advance of 
presidential elections, so as to 
assist Republicans and to 
harm Democrats, after 
controlling for the relevant 
economic variables. 
+ 
•  Gamber and Hakes 
(1997) 
•  Change in the Federal 
Funds rate 
•  U.S./1955.10 
1992.12/monthly 
 
•  Reaction function of Fed Funds 
rate  including aggregate supply and 
demand shocks 
•  Intercept and slope partisan 
dummies  
•  During Democratic 
presidential regimes  
The Fed responds to 
aggregate shocks more 
vigorously in pre election 
periods than in post election 
ones 
•  During Republican 
administrations monetary 
policy is more responsive to 
aggregate shocks in post 
election periods 
•  Monetary policy is more 
counter cyclically activist 
under a Democrat 
administration than under a 




•  McGregor (1996) 
•  Federal funds rate 
•  U.S./1960 1987/349 
regular meetings of the 
FOMC 
•  Interest rate reaction function 
•  Model  explains  the  votes  of  11 
members  and  the  interest  rate 
selected at each FOMC rneeting 
•  Structural parameters of the model 
are estimated by maximum 
likelihood 
•  Hypotheses tested using 
conventional statistics based on the 
likelihood function 
•  Impact of Democratic Governors 
voting under Democratic 
Presidents, Republican Governors 
voting under Republican 
Presidents, Democratic Governors 
voting under Republican Presidents 
and Republican Governors voting 
under Democratic Presidents 
•  Democratic Governors prefer 
lower interest rates than 
traditional Republican 
Governors and supply side 
(i.e., Reagan appointed) 
Governors prefer even lower 
interest rates than democratic 
Governors. 
•  Politically appointed 
Governors, taken as a group, 
prefer lower interest rates 
than the non politically 
appointed Reserve Bank 
presidents 
•  Controlling for the state of the 
economy and for the 
prevailing stance of monetary 
policy, both partisan 




The total number of 24 studies in the field implies that quantitative analyses of the effects of 
partisanship on monetary instruments have been relatively scarce (Boix 2000, p. 44). 
In the following, we briefly discuss the findings of three important studies on partisan 
monetary policy in OECD countries.  Clark (2003) examines the impact of left labor power on 
interest rates in a panel of (a maximum of) 14 OECD countries and finds that left labor power 
was associated with higher, not lower, interest rates. Boix (2000) evaluates the impact of socialist 
control of government and organizational power of labor on short term real interest rates in 
advanced nations in the period 1961 1994. The evidence he gains is mixed and depends on the 
sample and the specification chosen. Some of his results suggest that central banks under leftist 
governments increased short term real interest rates compared to rightwing governments. 
Sakamoto (2008) analyses panel data for 18 OECD countries in the period 1960 2001 and 
distinguishes  between  leftwing,  rightwing  and  center  governments  respectively  by  different 
variables.  His  basic  results  (p.  154)  suggest  that  leftist  governments  had  a  somewhat  looser 
monetary policy
10, whereas the coefficients of rightwing and center governments are statistically 
insignificant.  Interacting  the  leftwing  government  dummy  and  central  bank  independence, 
however,  suggests  that  leftist  governments  under  independent  central  banks  produced  the 
tightest monetary policy. “This suggests that central banks may have tightened monetary policy to 
offset  the  left’s  expansionary  policy  (remember  that  left  governments’  fiscal  policy  was 
expansionary when they faced independent central banks in the 1960s and 1970s)” (Sakamoto 
2008,  p.  228).  In  addition,  interacting  the  rightwing  government  dummy  and  central  bank 
independence,  suggests  that  rightwing  governments  under  independent  central  banks 
implemented a loose (expansionary) monetary policy (p. 240). 
These three studies, however, employ annual data. This is a serious shortcoming because 
central bank interest rates are volatile and can change remarkably per year. For this reason, more 
                                                 
10 His dependent monetary policy variable is calculated as “discount rates minus Taylor rule implied discount rates” 
See Sakamoto (2008), p. 90. 
 -10- 
 
(McGregor,  1996).  Following  the  appointment  process,  oversight  might  influence  monetary 
policy as well (Caporale and Grier 1998, p. 423, Falaschetti 2002, p. 492) 
Third, the transmission could be the result of direct political pressure on the members of 
the  monetary  policy  committee.  The  latter  might  undergo  bashing  and  coercion  by  the 
government. Moreover, political threats to the status, structure, or even existence of the central 
bank may force central bankers to comply with politically motivated demands on monetary policy 
(Lohmann 1998).  
Overall, to systematically influence the overall inflation rate, governments require control 
of monetary policy instruments. Since central banks are responsible for the conduct of monetary 
policy, it follows that differences in central bank organization imply variance in the ability of 
office holders to manipulate the inflation rate. As a result, the ability of governments to pursue 
distinctive partisan policies and to generate favorable outcomes of the inflation rate is contingent on 
the organization of central banking institutions, most notably central bank independence. Accordingly, 
the conventional logic and predictions of partisan theories of the macro economy should hold 
only in countries where the central bank is under political control, i.e. dependent.
9  
 
Recent empirical evidence 
Recent  empirical  studies  for  OECD  countries,  however,  do  not  suggest  that  leftist 
governments have pursued more expansionary monetary policies than rightwing governments. In 
contrast, interest rates were often found to be higher under leftwing than rightwing governments. 
Table 1 summarizes the results of the most recent studies on partisan monetary policy. During 
the last 13 years, only a few panel data studies were published. Among the single country studies, 
investigations for the U.S. and Germany dominate. 19 out of 24 studies reported in Table 1 
found supporting evidence of ideological impacts on monetary policy in one way or the other. 
                                                 
9 Other recent research has begun to rectify this oversight. Particularly notable are Alesina and Summers (1993), 
Clark and Reichert (1998) and Franzese (1999). 
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loyalties appear to play an 
important role in the 
Governors’ voting calculus 
+ 
•  Tempelman (2007) 
•  Actual changes in the 
fed funds rate along 






•  Narrative with permanent reference 
to Abrams and Iossifov (2006) 
•  Long sample period used by 
Abrams and Iossifov (2006) 
obscures changes in trends 
during the period stemming 
from advances in 
macroeconomic theory and  
the implementation of 
monetary policy.  
•  When one considers only the 
Volcker–Greenspan era 
(1979–2004), there is 
insufficient evidence to accept 
the notion of a political 




•  Berger and Woitek 
(1997a) 
•  M1 and the 
Bundesbank discount 
rate 
•  Germany/1950 
1989/monthly 
 
•  Multi equation VAR models with 
and without an additional trend 
component to cope with non 
stationarity 
•  Dummy for exogenous changes in 
government ideology 
•  Separate estimation for right wing 
and leftwing periods 
•  Almost  no  support  for  the 
predictions  of  the  partisan 
school,  neither  in  its  non 
rational  (Hibbs)  nor  rational 
expectations  versions 
(Alesina).  
•  It  appears  that  to  reproduce 
the  evidence  reported  by 
literature,  in  some  cases  the 
implications  of  non 




•  Vaubel (1997a, 1997b) 
•  At least partially 
seasonally adjusted 
monthly data for M1 
•  Germany/federal 
election dates 1949 
1994/monthly/season
ally unadjusted data 
•  Non parametric tests as a way out 
of the dilemma that using moving 
averages of monetary aggregate 
does not distinguish between 
successive central bank regimes in a 
clear cut way but the regime effects 
might have been swamped by 
control errors and noise in the data 
if month to month changes are 
used 
•  'Party preference hypothesis': 
Bundesbank tries to improve the 
electoral prospects of the 
government if the government 
commands a partisan majority in 
the central bank council, and it tries 
to prevent the government from 
being re elected if the opposition 
parties have a partisan majority in 
the central bank council. 
•  Monetary expansion (M1) 
accelerates when the 
government has a political 
majority in the central bank 
council at the beginning of the 
pre election period 
•  Monetary expansion 




•  Berger and Woitek (1997) 
•  Annualized M1 growth 
rate/ Bundesbank 
discount rate 
•  Germany/1950 
1989/monthly, 
seasonally adjusted 
•  Policy instrument regressed on its 
own lagged value and a dummy 
variable active in certain periods 
before federal elections multiplied 
by the partisan position of the 
majority of ‘political’ members of 
the Bundesbank council towards 
the government 
•  Time series analysis: results 
run counter to the Vaubel 
(2007) hypothesis.  
•  Central bank council minutes: 
results point in the same 
direction.  
•  Opportunistic government is 
better off facing an 
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•  OLS 
•  Robustness checks using M2, M3 
changes 
ideologically opposing 
Bundesbank council majority 
than a supportive one before 
elections. 
+ 
•  Berger and Woitek (2001) 
•  Short term (day to 




•  Test for PBC in Bundesbank 
monetary policy reaction function 
plus controls for the effects of fixed 
exchange rate regimes 
•  Indirect test: changes in money 
demand prior to elections occurred 
because, when political parties have 
different inflation preferences and 
election results are uncertain, 
rational investors avoid entering 
long term financial contracts before 
elections 
•  Vaubel’s (1997a) observation 
of central bank independence 
and political business cycles in 
German monetary aggregates 
•  But no sign of a systematic 
decline of short term interest 
rates before the election 
•  Cycles originated from 
partisan and electoral 
uncertainty induced shifts in 
money demand that were 
tolerated by the Bundesbank, 
because the bank followed an 
interest rate policy rule.14 
+ 
  
•  Berger and Woitek (2005) 
•  First part: change in 
the discount rate; 
second and third part: 
short term (day to day) 
interest rate 




meetings, second and 




•  OLS regressions of the percentages 
of “no votes” by Council members 
nominated by conservative, social 
democratic and neutral Laender and 
federal governments on discount 
rate changes in percentage points 
 
Second part 
•  Standard reaction function (TSLS 
estimation) for short term interest 
rates, including monetary targets 
and dummy variables to capture the 
effect of different council regimes 
or majorities. Among them: 
•  CONS = 1 whenever the number 
of conservative political votes in 
the Bundesbank Council exceeds 
50%. Otherwise CONS=0. 
•  Controls for periods of Bretton 
Woods and German unification. 
 
Third part 
•  Structural VAR in annualized 
differences: is monetary policy 
conducted under conservative and 
non conservative Bundesbank 
regimes different when interaction 
between interest rates and the 
determinants of monetary policy is 
taken into account? 
•  Compares the impulses based on 
just identifying restrictions and 
generalized impulse responses to 
sudden inflationary pressure. 
First part 
•  Social democratic appointees 
especially seem to be more 
likely to resist upward than 
downward changes of the 
discount rate. 
•  Conservatives in the Council 
cast their votes independently 
of the direction of the policy 
change.  
•  Neutral members lean in the 
direction of the social 





•  Only in the case of CPI 
inflation is the conservative 
long run coefficient 
significantly (at least at the 
10% level) larger than the 
long run coefficient under 




•  Conservatism mattered for the 
way the Bundesbank 
conducted monetary policy. 
•  More conservative Council 
majorities reacted more 
aggressively to inflationary 




                                                 
14
 Interest rate forecasts ranging far into post election periods imply a weighted average of the inflation rates over all 
possible election results. Hence, financial investors cope with this uncertainty by trading longer term assets for 
shorter term assets and, thus, enlarging monetary aggregate just before election dates which looks like a political 
business cycle à la Nordhaus (1975). 
-9- 
 
McGregor 1993); 2) direct signalling of desired monetary policies from the administration to the 
central bank
7 (Havrilesky 1988, 1991, Sieg, 1997), 3) bashing and coercion by the administration 
(García de Paso 2000, Lohmann 1998, Waller 1991).  
First, government ideology has an influence on (presidential) appointments to the board 
of the monetary authority. Though a central bank might be independent, political parties do have 
a certain influence on the bank, in that they nominate the members of the central bank council. A 
political party may tend exclusively to nominate individuals with political preferences similar to its 
own ones (Havrilesky and Gildea 1992; Havrilesky 1993, Vaubel 1993, 1997a and Berger and 
Woitek 1997).
8 These individuals, in turn, may feel loyal to the party which has appointed them 
(Goehlmann and Vaubel 2007). Thus, council members are associated with the views of one 
party, and they therefore may try to manipulate the economy to increase the election probability 
of  their  party  (Sieg  1997).  Empirical  analysis  of  Fed  board  members’  voting  patterns  leads 
Chappell, Havrilesky and McGegor (1993) to conclude that partisanship in the appointments 
process is the primary mechanism by which partisan differences in desired monetary policies arise.  
Second, signaling is an important channel. The government may send monetary policy 
signals to the central bank based on media appearances in which administration officials express a 
desire for easier or tighter monetary policy. This in turn might have a significant effect on the 
money supply. In reaction functions, the media coverage of the administration typically responds 
to variables which measure the state of the economy. Money growth, however, does not respond 
to the same state of the economy measures but does respond to signals from the administration 
                                                 
7
 This signaling is apparently opposed to the signals send from the central banks which are discussed extensively in 
the literature. For surveys of the literature on central bank communication and monetary policy see, for example, 
Blinder et al. (2008), De Haan (2008), De Haan et al. (2007). 
8
 Waller (1992) develops a bargaining model to analyze the appointment of central bankers in a two party political 
system. His model suggests that the party in power will appoint partisans early on but later appointments will be 
increasingly moderate in their views concerning monetary policy and that in equilibrium, nominations to the board 
are not rejected, thus confirmation hearings appear to be nothing more than a ‘rubber stamp’ process. The latter 
result implies that – at least theoretically   the out of power parties are not able to exert some influence through 
confirmation hearings. Mixon and Gibson (2002) deliver empirical evidence for the US which corroborates 
theoretical foundations of Waller's bargaining model. -8- 
 
provided, for example, by Belke (1996), p. 199, and pp. 214 216. These old fashioned studies on 
partisan monetary policy, however, need to be criticized in several ways.  
 
Central Bank Independence and channels of transmission 
Evaluating  whether  government  ideology  has  had  an  influence  on  monetary  policy 
requires a robust operationalization of central bank independence.
6 Most important, the greater a 
central bank’s ability to choose policy goals without government interference and the greater its 
control over policy instruments is, the more significant is its independence from politics. In other 
words, independent central banks control both the means and ends of monetary policy. Even the 
most autonomous central bank, however, does not make policy in a political vacuum (Hayo and 
Hefeker 2002, Lohmann 1998). To preserve their independent status and to fend off legislation 
aimed at changing bank organization, even the most autonomous banks, such as the former 
Bundesbank or the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank, had to accommodate political pressures in the 
past to some degree. For instance, public support for the central bank needs to be sufficiently 
strong to make the implementation of sometimes harsh monetary policy measures successful 
(Hayo  and  Hefeker  2002,  p.  670).  Hence,  although  some  central  banks  are  clearly  more 
independent than others, no bank is perfectly insulated from the demands of electoral or partisan 
politics. 
In  order  to  make  the  concept  of  ‘independence’  operational we  have  to  identify  the 
channels through which partisan influence from a specific administration and/or government 
may be transmitted to the central bank and affect monetary policy. Scholars have concentrated 
on three main transmission channels: 1) central bank appointments (Falaschetti 2002, pp. 492f., 
Galbraith,  Giovannoni  and  Russo  2007,  p.  18,  Gildea  1990,  Havrilesky  and  Gildea,  1992, 
Havrilesky and Schweitzer 1990, Lohmann 1998, Waller 1989, 1992, Chappell, Havrilesky and 
                                                 
6
 For an encompassing survey on the political economy of central bank independence see, for example, Eijffinger 
and De Haan (1996) and for recent contributions the survey by De Haan et al. (2008). 
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Other    
•  Efthyvoulou (2008) 
•  Growth rates of M1 
and M2, and two 
short term interest 
rates (retail bank 
marginal lending rate) 
and 3 month treasury 
bill rate) 
•  Cyprus/1978 
2006/quarterly 
•  Taylor rule specification 
•  Maximum Likelihood   ARCH 
(errors normally distributed) 
•  Test for significance of temporary 
and permanent partisan dummies 
•  Left wing governments follow 
more  expansionary  monetary 
policies  than  right  wing 
governments 
•  Monetary  growth  aggregates 
and, to a lesser extent nominal 
interest  rates,  are 




•  Serletis and Afxentiou 
(1998) 
•  Monetary base 
•  Canada/1926 
1994/annual 
•  Pre testing with integration and 
cointegration tests 
•  Examination of dynamic co 
movements of the cyclical 
components of key target and 
instrument variables 
•  Regressing the cyclical components 
of instrument variables against a list 
of partisan dummies 
•  Check of robustness to alternative 
stationarity inducing 
transformations of variables 
•  Party political dummies do 




•  Ferris (2008) 
•  Logarithm of the BoC 
bank rate/difference 
between the logarithm 
of the bank rate and 
the logarithm of the 
five year yield on 
government bonds 
•  Canada/ 1935–
2006/annual 
•  Error correction model  
•  Taylor reaction function with 
interest rate smoothing 
•  Set of political variables to test for 
the  partisan  distinctiveness  of 
electoral  outcomes,  PT  and  RPT 
dummies 
•  Election of a Liberal party 
government positively 
influences the expansiveness 
of Canadian monetary policy 
+ 
  
Note: Pluses (“+”) indicate that the cited studies found supporting evidence of ideological impacts on 






Table 2. Descriptive statistics and data sources 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev  Min  Max  Source 
Short term nominal interest 
rate  1399  7.69  4.84  0.03  37.67 
OECD Main Economic 
Indicatiors (2008) 
Ideology  1399  2.85  0.93  1  4  Potrafke (2009) 
Central bank dependence  1399  0.45  0.23  0.06  0.81  Klomp and de Haan (2008) 
Inflation (CPI growth)  1399  0.92  0.98  -1.93  8.54  OECD Main Economic 
Indicators (2008) 
Output gap 
1399  -0.65  2.61  -12.31  7.97 








Table 3. Regression results. Basic Taylor Rule. 
Dependent Variable: Short term nominal interest rate.  
Heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) Newey West type standard errors. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  FGLS  FGLS  FGLS  FGLS 
Inflation  1.8275***  1.9707***  0.5535***  0.5841*** 
  [8.94]  [8.89]  [4.08]  [4.13] 
Output gap  0.0536**  0.0376  0.0618***  0.0447*** 
  [2.09]  [1.39]  [3.77]  [2.75] 
Lagged dependent variable      0.7604***  0.8231*** 
      [14.36]  [18.92] 
Constant  9.6155***  9.2393***  2.0834***  1.4797** 
  [11.08]  [10.80]  [3.28]  [2.16] 
Fixed Country Effects  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Fixed Period Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  1459  1459  1459  1459 
Number of N  15  15  15  15 
R Squared (overall)  0.81    0.94   






Table 4. Regression Results. Taylor Rule. Ideology included. 
Dependent variable: short term nominal interest rate.  
Heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) Newey West type standard errors. 
  (1)  (2) 
  FGLS  FGLS 
Ideology  0.3696***  0.0423 
  [5.86]  [1.29] 
Inflation  1.8721***  0.5786*** 
  [8.33]  [4.10] 
Output gap  0.0460*  0.0456*** 
  [1.70]  [2.79] 
Lagged dependent variable    0.8213*** 
    [18.68] 
Constant  9.9678***  1.3992** 
  [9.10]  [2.09] 
Fixed Country Effects  No  No 
Fixed Period Effects  Yes  Yes 
Observations  1459  1459 
Number of N  15  15 







cause a significantly higher (trend in) inflation and a significantly lower (trend in) unemployment 
(Berlemann and Markwardt 2007, Drazen 2000, Gaertner 1994). The rational partisan theory 
(RPT), however, claims upward (downward) post election blips in unemployment for rightwing 
(leftwing) regimes due to wage rigidities combined with electoral uncertainty. Following the more 
recent literature, we do not differentiate between PT and RPT any further. 
Empirical tests based on the old fashioned Philips curve partisan monetary policy models 
typically assume that the inflation rate is almost exclusively driven by monetary policy, notably 
money growth. These traditional tests, however, suffer from technical deficiencies in different 
regards.  First,  the  proponents  of  the  traditional  partisan  theory  such  as  Alesina  (1988)  and 
Havrilesky (1994), p. 117, for simplicity start from the assumption that the time pattern of the 
inflation rate and the money growth rate are identical at each point in time (Belke, 1996, p. 104). 
But  referring  to  the  well known  quantity  equation,  this  must  not  necessarily  be  the  case, 
especially if the growth rate of the income velocity of money is not equal to zero or if there is 
positive real growth. Second, the traditional studies focusing on money growth implicitly assume 
that money aggregates can be exactly steered by the monetary authority. Hence, as opposed to 
the view  taken in  the  mainstream  partisan  theory  literature,  the adequate specification  of  an 
ideologically driven money growth cycle is still open to debate (Belke 1996, pp. 98 104, and 
García de Paso 1996).  
Nevertheless, several studies   mainly originating from the late 1980s and the early 1990s   
test for ideological impacts on monetary policy and employ money growth as the dependent 
variable.
5 In these studies money growth is typically used as the dependent variable, while no 
importance is attached to the degree of central bank independence as a moderating variable. An 
encompassing  survey  of  the  empirical  results  for  the  partisan  theory  till  the  mid  1990s  is 
                                                 
5García de Paso (1996) shows in a game theoretic framework that one should expect higher average money growth 
rates under leftwing governments. However, a lot more studies examine the validity of the opportunistic Nordhaus 
type political business cycle theory instead of the partisan theory. As early examples, Meiselman (1986) and Grier 
(1989) find election cycle patterns in money growth data for the US. -6- 
 
2.  Partisan monetary policy: theoretical background and empirical 
evidence 
 
Political business cycles and the partisan approach 
Various  economic  theories  explain  why  different  politicians  will  implement  different 
policies  –  Downs’  (1957)  fundamental  convergence  result  notwithstanding.  If  politicians  are 
assumed to be motivated not only by self interest but to also care about the political outcomes, 
probabilistic voting models exhibit equilibria in which leftwing and rightwing politicians offer 
different platforms.
3 The empirical political science literature provides interesting insights why we 
ought not to expect modern parties to be ideological in any pure sense of the word (e.g. Katz and 
Mair 1995, Blyth and Katz 2005). In spite of these developments, politicians’ behavior is however 
still expected to affect economic policy. The political business cycle approaches and the partisan 
theory  indicate  how  politicians  influence  macroeconomic  outcomes.  One  implication  of  the 
political business cycle theories (of Nordhaus 1975, and Rogoff and Sibert 1988, among others) is 
that all politicians will implement the same expansionary economic policy before elections. In 
other  words,  political  ideology  retires  to  the  background,  and  policies  converge.  In  these 
approaches,  informational  asymmetries  between  politicians  and  voters  take  centre  stage  in 
explaining  electoral  cycles.  The  incumbent  exploits  his  information  advantage  to  signal  his 
economic competence before elections.  
The partisan approach, on the other hand, focuses on the role of party ideology and 
shows  to what  extent  leftwing  and  rightwing  politicians will  provide  policies  that  reflect  the 
preferences of their partisans. The leftist party appeals more to the labor base and promotes 
expansionary  policies,  whereas  the  rightwing  party  appeals  more  to  capital  owners,  and  is 
therefore more concerned with reducing inflation. This holds for both branches of the partisan 
theory     the  classical approach  (Hibbs  1977)  and  the  rational  approach (Alesina  1987).
4  The 
traditional partisan theory (PT) is generally regarded as empirically valid if leftist governments 
                                                 
3
 See e.g. Mueller (2003): Chapters 11 13 and Persson and Tabellini (2000): Chapters 3 and 5 for a survey of the 
respective fundamental literature on party competition. 
4






Table 5. Regression results. Ideology and central bank dependence interacted (normalized) 
Dependent variable: short term nominal interest rate.  
Heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) Newey West type standard errors. 
  (1)  (2) 
  FGLS  FGLS 
Ideology  0.2324***  0.0233 
  [3.88]  [0.77] 
Central bank dependence  0.7259***  0.1784*** 
  [9.47]  [3.94] 
Ideology* Central bank dependence   0.0872   0.0509* 
  [1.41]  [1.68] 
Inflation  1.8657***  0.5611*** 
  [7.94]  [3.73] 
Output gap  0.0959***  0.0569*** 
  [3.60]  [3.56] 
Lagged dependent variable    0.8171*** 
    [16.59] 
Constant  9.0713***  0.7633 
  [8.65]  [1.52] 
Fixed Country Effects  No  No 
Fixed Period Effects  Yes  Yes 
Observations  1399  1396 
Number of N  15  15 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Table 6. Marginal Effects of government ideology (leftwing) at a minimum, average and 
maximum level of central bank dependence (normalized) 

























Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets (absolute values); * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***     











Descriptive country statistics: short term nominal interest rate 
Country  Mean  Std. Dev  # Obs 
Australia  9.58  4.64  104 
Cananda  6.37  3.15  84 
Germany  4.43  2.29  59 
Denmark  6.50  3.30  84 
Finland  8.33  4.82  104 
France  7.44  3.99  104 
Ireland  7.38  4.22  88 
Iceland  11.31  7.64  72 
Italy  10.18  5.64  104 
Japan  3.59  3.24  104 
Netherlands  5.66  2.70  104 
Norway  9.09  4.18  104 
New Zealand  10.98  5.38  104 
Sweden  7.93  4.10  96 
USA  5.31  2.30  84 
Total  7.69  4.84  1399 
 
 
Descriptive country statistics: ideology (leftwing) 
Country  Mean  Std. Dev  # Obs 
Australia  2.97  1.05  104 
Cananda  2.98  1.26  84 
Germany  2.98  1.01  59 
Denmark  2.67  0.84  84 
Finland  2.85  0.36  104 
France  3.12  1.00  104 
Ireland  2.35  0.48  88 
Iceland  2.40  0.49  72 
Italy  2.98  0.64  104 
Japan  2.13  0.33  104 
Netherlands  2.83  0.86  104 
Norway  3.08  1.00  104 
New Zealand  2.82  1.16  104 
Sweden  3.69  0.73  96 
USA  2.76  0.98  84 










independent and subject to directives of the government. Interestingly, taking into account the 
interaction between central bank independence and government ideology, the existing studies 
suggest  that  leftist  governments  did  not  pursue  expansionary  monetary  policies  at  all.  The 
existing studies, however, do not only cover the time period till the beginning of this millennium, 
but also contain econometric shortcomings. 
In this paper, we therefore integrate government ideology, central bank (in)dependence 
and their interaction in monetary policy reaction functions (Taylor rule) in order to examine 
whether  leftist  governments  have  implemented  expansionary  monetary  policies  in  OECD 
countries from 1980.1 to 2005.4. We employ quarterly instead of annual data because central 
bank interest rates are volatile and can change remarkably per year. We use the updated indicator 
of government ideology by Potrafke (2009) that explicitly refers to the left right scale of the 
governing parties and the new time variant indicator on central bank (in)dependence by Klomp 
and De Haan (2008). The results suggest that leftist governments did not decrease short term 
nominal interest rates at all. In contrast, short term nominal interest rates were higher under 
leftist governments. A potential reason for this finding might be that leftist governments have 
sought to make a market oriented policy shift by delegating monetary policy to conservative 
central bankers. Overall, our results suggest doubt about the influence of government ideology 
on monetary policy. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the impact of 
government ideology on monetary policy and reviews the theoretical and empirical literature. 
Section 3 presents the data and specifies the empirical model. Section 4 reports the regression 










1.  Introduction 
Partisan theories follow  a rather simple logic. Voters have heterogeneous  preferences 
over outcomes, either because of differing economic interests or differing ideologies. For this 
reason, electorally motivated political parties are expected to adhere to divergent ideologies, to 
deliver  different  policy  programs,  and  to  serve  core  constituencies  which  are  differentially 
affected by macroeconomic outcomes. The partisan theories predict that leftwing governments 
will emphasize achieving low unemployment rates at the expense of higher inflation and suggest 
that rightwing governments will pursue low inflation rates at the expense of unemployment. 
Hence, the main character of partisan theory is often described as a “political macroeconomic 
outcomes theory of monetary policy” which works via a Phillips curve tradeoff (Havrilesky 1990, 
p. 50, and Way 2000).  
The old fashioned Philips curve models, however, imply that the inflation rate is almost 
exclusively  driven  by  monetary  policy,  notably  money  growth.  Several  studies  –  mainly 
originating from the late 1980s and the early 1990s – have investigated whether government 
ideology has had an influence on monetary policy and employed money growth as the dependent 
variable. The derivation of an ideologically driven money growth cycle, however, is not at all 
trivial  and  unambiguous  as  assumed  by  the  mainstream  partisan  theory  literature  (see,  for 
example, Belke 1996, pp. 98 104). Moreover, there is no consensus how parties affect monetary 
policy, but monetary surprises appear as an unconvincing driving force for traditional partisan 
political cycles (Drazen 2000). 
Scholars have recently investigated political and/or ideological impacts on unintermediate 
monetary policy instruments such as central bank interest rates instead of money growth, among 
them Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997), Boix (2000), Clark (2003) and Sakamoto (2008) for 
OECD countries. Politicians, however, do not directly have an influence on interest rates, but are 
obliged to institutional restrictions, most notably central bank independence. For this reason, 





Descriptive country Statistics: Central bank dependence 
Country  Mean  Std. Dev  # Obs 
Australia  0.41  0.03  104 
Cananda  0.34  0.03  84 
Germany  0.14  0.03  59 
Denmark  0.37  0.13  84 
Finland  0.56  0.33  104 
France  0.31  0.25  104 
Ireland  0.43  0.18  88 
Iceland  0.53  0.18  72 
Italy  0.54  0.23  104 
Japan  0.60  0.03  104 
Netherlands  0.29  0.12  104 
Norway  0.67  0.15  104 
New Zealand  0.65  0.12  104 
Sweden  0.50  0.28  96 
USA  0.25  0.00  84 
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